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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Anti-vehicle mines (AVMs) have always had a humanitarian impact, but their
significance has often been overshadowed by the higher-profile topic of
anti-personnel mines (APMs), and thus the need to address AVMs has been
neglected. In some countries, AVMs now present a greater threat to civilian
populations than APMs, yet they are often viewed as a marginal issue in
international fora.
This publication seeks to depict the physical, social, economic and developmental impact of AVMs. AVMs are landmines designed to be triggered by
vehicles rather than individual people. They can remain active for decades, and
a number of them are difficult to detect with normal demining equipment and
techniques. A reduction of the duration of the active life of AVMs, restrictions
on the laying of AVMs outside perimeter marked areas, increased detectability
and accurate recordkeeping should be promoted as immediate steps to limit
the humanitarian and developmental impact of these weapons.
When aid and development vehicles, agricultural machinery, private cars and
trucks and even large animals detonate AVMs, the consequences deploy far
beyond the immediate death, injury and destruction. Fear of further accidents
can have a devastating effect on supply networks in a number of ways. Past
cases have shown that when AVMs are present, it can become prohibitively
expensive to move resources to isolated communities; displaced people
cannot return to their homes; refugee camps must be maintained for longer
than necessary, draining funds away from reconstruction and rehabilitation
projects; and local trade in goods and agricultural products is reduced or
brought to a standstill. Thus, the indirect humanitarian impact of a single AVM
accident can be many times greater than that of an APM.
While the impact of APMs can decrease over time as clearance efforts
progress, this study found that in some instances the opposite trend is true
for AVMs. Increased mechanisation of agriculture, increased use of transport

10
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vehicles and the development of new infrastructure are all positive signs of a
recovering economy, but they also mean greater vulnerability to the threats
presented by abandoned and forgotten, but nonetheless active, AVMs.
In Cambodia, a doubling of
AVM casualties in recent years
has overshadowed the decline
in casualties from APMs. There
have been numerous incidents
where tractors loaded with ten
or more people hitting AVMs
in areas considered safe. As
increased prosperity has led
to growing mechanisation
of farming, vehicles are now
detonating AVMs in places that
had, for years, been safe for
foot traffic or non-mechanised
agricultural practices.

|
|

ICRC vehicle damaged by an AVM in Angola.
The accident resulted in five casualties.

In addition, as Afghanistan and South Sudan work to stabilize their societies
and expand their economies, numerous infrastructural, agricultural and
housing development projects in line with these goals have been hindered
by the presence of AVMs.
Figures provided by affected states and news media reports make it clear that
AVMs represent a significant and continuing humanitarian problem. However,
poor reporting of incidents results in inconsistent statistics, hampering a
better understanding of the scale of the problem and its on-going impact.
To address this, it is essential that government and mine action personnel
take steps to make reporting more reliable and able to distinguish between
AVM and APM incidents.
AVMs are not subject to the same rules applied to APMs in International
humanitarian law (IHL) In the absence of a more stringent legal framework
regulating AVM use, much remains to be done in terms of the implementation of
current provisions to ensure compliance with humanitarian principles and norms.

Executive Summary
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INTRODUCTION

This publication is based on a research project to assess the humanitarian and
developmental impact of anti-vehicle mines. As the international community
continues to explore the possible need and options for further legal regulation of
AVMs,1 there remains a demand for more rigorous analysis of the specific impact
of AVMs on civilians and developing societies that are either in the midst of, or
recovering from, conflict. This publication seeks to bridge this knowledge gap,
highlight trends and shortcomings and offer recommendations.
The study found that the presence of AVMs, laid on roads, on roadsides and in
fields not only continues to result in civilian deaths and injuries, but also has a
number of permeating negative effects on communities and states as a whole.
These effects include inhibiting humanitarian aid, delaying post-conflict recovery,
and hampering development efforts in both the near and long-term. Furthermore,
AVM presence causes fear and thus has an enduring ability to prevent populations
from using land productively, using transport effectively and building infrastructure.
The study proposes a number of recommendations, including:
1. Discussions on further regulating the use of AVMs to comply

with existing IHL principles should continue.
2. Geographic coordinates of mines and minefields should be

systematically recorded.
3. If AVM use cannot be deterred or prevented, States should explore

ways of increasing detectability.
4. Civilian populations should be educated on the specific hazards

posed by AVMs.
5. States should be encouraged to disaggregate their landmine data

to better distinguish APMs and AVMs.
6. Reporting forms should be further standardized.

The study was carried out jointly by the Geneva International Centre for
Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI). Its methodology involved gathering existing literature, legal
documents and information (documentation, data and interviews) from mine
action centres (MACs) and operators on the ground, conducting national AVM
basic impact surveys (BIS) and fieldwork, and from soliciting expert advice.
The study features case studies from Afghanistan, Cambodia and South Sudan.

1 Also commonly known as anti-tank mines (ATM) and mines other than anti-personnel mines
(MOTAPM)

14
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This publication provides a background to AVMs, with a section exploring
technical aspects followed by an explanation of applicable legal frameworks.
A global overview covers data availability, current usage, casualty data and
impacts on development. The three case studies provide concrete examples of
these findings. The conclusions identify trends and make recommendations based
on the research.

Increased prosperity in northwestern Cambodia has led to a growing mechanisation of farming activities, including a higher number of tractors. These are
detonating anti-vehicle mines in places that had, for years, been safe for foot
traffic or non-mechanised agricultural practices. Eight Cambodian farmers
were killed and one was critically injured on 3 February 2012, after their truck
hit two anti-tank mines in Banteay Meanchey province. Seven of the farmers
died instantly as the truck ran over the AVM; the eighth victim died later in
hospital from the injuries sustained in the blast.

Introduction

|
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BACKGROUND

CHARACTERISTICS
An AVM is a type of landmine designed to damage or destroy vehicles, including
tanks and armoured fighting vehicles. Compared to APMs, AVMs typically have a
much larger explosive charge and a fuse designed to be triggered only by pressure
akin to that of vehicles. Some AVMs are also manufactured with additional fusing
systems, giving users the option of fitting anti-disturbance and anti-handling
devices, triggered by countermeasures or when someone tampers with the mine
or tries to remove it from the ground. AVMs are designed to damage or destroy
hardware and to injure or kill vehicle crews and passengers.

Simplicity
While the technical design of AVMs has changed over time, the underlying
concept remains the same: most are simple, adaptable and can be mass-produced
at relatively low cost. A fusing mechanism responds to pressure or the proximity
of a target and is connected to a large explosive charge. Simplicity brings low-cost
reliability and therefore makes the weapon attractive and available to almost all
armed forces, regardless of their budgets. Although more sophisticated electronic
fuses are becoming available, their high cost has prevented widespread use.
Whatever the type of AVM, they are still cheap relative to the weapon systems
that they are designed to defeat.

Versatility
AVMs very effectively render ground unusable. They can be used to deny access to
one area, to channel enemy forces into another desired area and to slow down an
enemy’s advance, giving time for defenders to marshal their forces and exposing
enemy armour to more effective anti-armour fires. AVMs can be laid by hand,
mechanically, remotely by aircraft and artillery or scattered by other systems from
less than 500 metres. Different fuse systems respond to pressure, break wires,
electric commands and a range of electrical and magnetic sensors. Many types
of AVMs offer the option to fit different types of fuse providing more flexibility for
military and non-state actors (NSA). Almost all AVMs can be booby-trapped using
manufactured features or improvised devices to add further unpredictability to
their use. Different types of AVMs may be buried, laid on the surface or placed at
the roadside to increase their range and impact.

Lack of discrimination
AVMs are generally designed to discriminate between smaller targets (persons
and sometimes smaller vehicles) and larger ones (larger vehicles and tanks).
18
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They do so primarily by requiring more force to be applied to trigger them than
would normally be associated with a person on foot. Most magnetic fuses
respond only to the larger metallic-magnetic signature associated with a vehicle
or tank. None of these systems can reliably discriminate between a military and
a civilian target.

Longevity
Few AVMs have self-destruction, self-neutralisation mechanisms or selfdeactivating feature designed to make them safe after a set period of time. Most
AVMs continue to be dangerous to populations after conflicts have finished and
for as long as the fusing mechanism and explosive fill remain functional. While
climate, temperature and solar radiation all degrade the function of AVMs, some
types, made from tough plastics and high quality internal components are likely
to remain dangerous for very long periods of time – certainly years and in many
cases several decades. Under the right conditions even metal cased mines from
the Second World War have been found to be in excellent condition well into the
21st century.

|

An AVM on a road in Angola.
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Features
Most AVMs are pressure-operated with a relatively simple mechanical fusing
system initiating a main charge housed in a thin outer casing. Many use TNT
or TNT/RDX as the main charge, though others occasionally use more powerful
explosives or mixtures. Plastic casings are widely used for ease of manufacture
and resilience, though wooden and metal casings are still found in older designs.
Shock-resistant fuses are used to defeat explosive mine countermeasures and
allow scattering. Booby-trapped AVMs incorporate integral anti-handling features
to discourage hand lifting. Some AVMs contain very little metal, making them
extremely difficult to detect with the metal detectors used during most mine
clearance.
Although there have been many variations, the design of anti-vehicle blast mines
has been largely dictated by the requirement for mechanical laying or scattering
and efficient function. Cylindrical mines are most common, generally with
a central pressure plate or fuse. This configuration was widely favoured by the
major producers of landmines.

Employment
AVMs are normally buried flush to or just below the surface, to a depth of 50 mm;
at greater depths the fuse may be too well protected by the soil to operate. In
some countries, such as Cambodia and Afghanistan, AVMs were buried deep to
prevent detection and a wooden pole was used to transfer the pressure from the
ground level to the mine’s pressure plate. Minefields are often laid with a mix of
AVMs and APMs. In order to avoid sympathetic detonation, large AVMs are usually
placed several metres apart. Typically, the mines would be laid in straight lines or
zigzag ‘clusters’, where AVMs are surrounded by APMs. It is not uncommon for
two or more mines to be stacked in the same hole to produce a more powerful
blast that will penetrate armour. AVMs are also used by insurgent groups to deny
routes, ambush security forces or terrorise communities; some have been and can
be improvised or ‘locally manufactured’.2

Typical operation
The AVM is armed by the insertion of the fuse assembly or the completion of the
explosive train; some AVMs also incorporate an arming delay. Once armed, the
AVM is set off when sufficient force is applied. With pressure fuses, activation
normally results in the immediate detonation of the main charge.
2 IHS Janes, Mines & EOD Operational Guide – AT Blast Mines, March 2014

20
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Effect
Blast AVMs rely primarily on the shockwave produced by detonation of the high
explosive. Small AVMs tend to achieve ‘mobility kills’ on armoured vehicles by
damaging their running gear. Larger AVMs may destroy the vehicle and crew
completely, particularly if they have detonated beneath the hull.

AVM Clearance
Minimum metal AVMs present the greatest challenge to clearance operations:
slow manual excavation methods will be necessary if animal detection
systems (ADS) or mechanical clearance systems are unavailable or unsuitable.
The possibility of encountering anti-disturbance and anti-handling devices
means that AVMs are usually destroyed on site or, if it is necessary to move
them, are pulled remotely using a long line to keep clearance operators safe from
any explosion. Clearance rates are affected by other factors such as soil type,
vegetative cover and local climatic conditions.
Mechanical demining assets can significantly increase the rate of technical
survey and clearance, but most are not designed to withstand repeated AVM
detonations. Even if there is no critical damage to a machine, necessary repairs
can be expensive and time-consuming, particularly when operating in remote
locations. This creates ‘down-time’ that greatly increases the costs of such
operations.
Following the use of mechanical demining equipment on roads, repair work may
be required if the intervention has destroyed the road surface. Systems have
been developed that, owing to their size, mass and protection, are capable of
withstanding multiple AVM detonations without major damage. In practice,
however, some of these systems are hard to use in the operating environments
encountered in humanitarian demining because of their purchase price,
high running costs, requirements for maintenance and the inadequate local
infrastructure for transporting large machines. Locally manufactured machines
are also used for clearance and some Mine Protected Vehicles (MPVs), armoured
and designed to sustain an AVM blast, have been fitted with metal detection
systems and ground penetrating radar.
Animal detection systems (ADS) are based on the ability of certain animals to
detect the vapour emanating from landmines and other explosives. They can be
speedy and cost effective when searching for AVMs under the right conditions,
but they cannot normally be used in areas with dense vegetation and are easily
affected by adverse weather conditions.
Background
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Several systems exist for rapidly dispensing mines to cover wide areas, as opposed
to soldiers laying each one individually. Some AVMs are designed to be dropped
from aircraft or fired by artillery, and they arm themselves once they land in the
target area.
Off-route mines, also known as horizontal action mines, are designed to fire an
explosively formed projectile into the side of the target vehicle. They are used as
ambush mines or where the ground or road surface is not suitable for burying or
concealing a mine. They typically employ a shaped charge to focus the explosive
effect in order to pierce armour and the resulting over pressure within the vehicle
has a devastating impact on the crew.

DEVELOPMENTS OF AVMs IN THE 20th CENTURY
Even before the deployment of the first tanks in 1916, similar devices had been
developed for use against locomotives (e.g. by Confederate forces during the
American Civil War).
The First World War saw the first use of AVMs by the Germans as a counter
measure against the first tanks introduced by the British. Initially, they were nothing
more than a high explosive shell or mortar bomb buried upright with a special fuse.
Later, purpose built mines consisting of a wooden box packed with explosives and
triggered either remotely or by a pressure fuse were developed. By the end of the
war, the Germans had developed mine-laying techniques including the laying of
mine rows. AVMs accounted for up to 15 per cent of U.S. tank casualties during
the final stages of the war.
The Soviet Union began developing AVMs in the early 1920s, and in 1924
produced its first AVM. The mine had a 1kg charge: enough to break the tracks
of contemporary tanks. At the same time, in Germany, the first modern AVM, the
‘Tellermine’, entered service in 1929. It was a disc-shaped device, approximately
30cm wide, containing approximately 5kg of high explosives.
During the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), both sides used AVMs. Republican
forces lifted mines placed by Nationalist forces and then used them against
the Nationalists. This encouraged the development of anti-handling devices for
AVMs. The Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland (1939–40) also
saw widespread use of AVMs, as did the Second World War. More sophisticated
features, such as shaped charges, satchel charges and sticky bombs, were also
developed.
22
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The second battle of El Alamein (23 October to 4 November 1942) and the
battle of Kursk (4 July to 23 August 1943) are two of the best examples of the
use of landmines, particularly antitank mines, during the Second World War.
In both cases, the defending forces relied on landmines to create a defensive
barrier and to help determine the path the attacking forces would take.
The principal difference lay in the ability of the defensive forces to hold their
positions once the attacker had cleared the minefields. At the second battle
of El Alamein, German forces under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel needed to
hold off a much larger British force. In an effort to stop the British advance,
Rommel ordered his engineers to put out 451,372 landmines. While the initial
plan called for 30 per cent of the mines to be anti-personnel mines, available
supplies limited the number of anti-personnel mines to only six per cent of
the mines used. Surprisingly, 180,000 of the mines were British AVMs from a
series of abandoned British minefields. While the Germans recovered some
of the English mines for new minefields, two of the British minefields were
incorporated directly into the Axis defences. In all, the Axis spent over three
months preparing the minefields at El Alamein. Most, if not all, of the minefields
were covered by artillery fire.3
AVMs used during the battles across North Africa and Europe more than
70 years ago still represent a threat. Egypt is continuously dealing with this
legacy, but occasionally a reminder from the past makes headlines in the heart
of Europe. For instance, in December 2011, a detonation tore a crater 10 meters
wide next to a road between the towns of Gross Ossnig and Neuhausen,
some 100 kilometres southeast of Berlin. The area had been a storage site for
a nearby bridge construction project. Bomb disposal experts found two more
mines nearby. They were too unstable to remove and had to be blown up in
the same spot. Some 400 residents living within one kilometre of the area
were evacuated and told to leave their doors and windows open to prevent
the glass shattering from the shockwaves. The area was the scene of fighting
in the Second World War because it was close to an airfield where newlybuilt Focke-Wulf combat aircraft tested their machine guns. The airfield was
bombed several times. Elderly locals recalled that weapons and munitions were
thrown in a bomb crater near the airfield. That might explain why the mines
were found buried three or four meters deep – they were evidently discarded.
If they had been planted to take out a tank, they would have been placed much
closer to the surface.

3 A dissertation in history – the development of landmine warfare by Norman Edgar Youngblood
IV, B.A, M.A (December 2002)
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Modern AVMs are usually more advanced than simple containers full of explosives
detonated by vehicle’s pressure. The main advances since the Second World War
have been:
• More powerful effective warheads (different explosive compounds and

shaped charge effects).
• Use of non-ferrous materials making them harder to detect.
• New methods of deployment (from aircraft or using artillery).
• More sophisticated fuses (triggered by magnetic and seismic effects,

or combinations of effects).
• Sophisticated ‘anti-disturbance’ devices to neutralise countermeasures

and prevent or discourage tampering or removal.

|
24

|

Background

Truck damaged by AVM explosion in Angola.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The use of AVMs is regulated by a set of IHL principles and rules, the vast majority
of which are set out in treaties and represent legal obligations for States who
are parties to those treaties. This chapter draws on a paper produced by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) entitled ‘Rules of international
humanitarian law applicable to anti-vehicle mines and presented at the Meeting of
Experts on Mines Other than Anti-Personnel Landmines within the framework of
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW),4 in April 2012.

Rules of customary international law
The rules of customary international law stem from the general practice accepted
as law and are independent of other provisions established in international treaties.
They may be applicable in international or non-international armed conflicts, or
both, and are binding on both states and non-state actors.
The most significant principles of customary IHL applicable to AVMs are distinction
and proportionality.
The ICRC study on customary international law details these rules as follows:5
• The principle of distinction requires parties to the conflict to distinguish

between civilians and combatants and to direct attacks against
combatants only.
• The principle of proportionality in attack prohibits attacks which may be

expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Additionally, the ICRC study recognises three specific customary rules which
directly address landmines and which are applicable to both APMs and AVMs:
1. Care must be taken to minimise the indiscriminate effects of landmines.
2. Parties to the conflict are required, as far as possible, to record the

placement of landmines.

4 ICRC, Rules of international humanitarian law applicable to anti-vehicle mines.
CCW/MSP/2012/WP.1 (2012)
5 ICRC ‘Customary IHL Database’, Rule 1,
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule1 (accessed: 21 March 2014)
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3. At the end of active hostilities, parties to the conflict that have used

landmines must remove or otherwise render them harmless to civilians,
or facilitate their removal.
Finally, the ICRC also recognises that ‘parties to the conflict must allow and
facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need,
which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction,
subject to their right of control’.6

Specific treaty rules
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
For States that are party to it, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions,
applicable to international arms conflicts, sets out important limits on the use of
AVMs, namely:
• Article 35 limits the right of parties to the conflict to choose any methods

and means of warfare and prohibits the use of weapons and methods
of warfare that can cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
• Article 51.5 prohibits indiscriminate attacks.
• Article 57.1 requires parties to take constant care to spare the civilian

population and civilian objects.
• Article 57.2 requires parties to take all feasible precautionary measures

in the choice of means and methods of attack in order to avoid, and
in any event minimise, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians
and damage to civilian objects.
Subject to certain conditions, Article 70 requires parties to the conflict to allow
and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment
and personnel.
As for non-international armed conflicts, Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions prohibits acts of violence against the life and person of people
taking no active part to hostilities. Additionally, within the framework of Additional
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions applicable to non-international armed

6 ICRC ‘Customary IHL Database’, Rule 55,
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule55 (accessed: 21 July 2014)
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conflicts, Article 13 stipulates that the civilian population and individual civilians
must not be the object of attack. In addition, Article 18.2 allows for humanitarian
and impartial relief actions for the civilian population.
Amended Protocol II, Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
AVMs themselves are not subject to a specific international convention, but are
subject to specific rules found in Amended Protocol II (APII) to the CCW. APII
specifically regulates the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices including
‘mines other than anti-personnel landmines’.7 Article 6(3) specifically deals with
‘remotely delivered mines other than AP mines (MOTAPM)’. The article states that:
‘It is prohibited to use remotely-delivered mines other than APMs, unless,
to the extent feasible, they are equipped with an effective self-destruction or selfneutralization mechanism and have a back-up self-deactivation feature, which
is designed so that the mine will no longer function as a mine when the mine
no longer serves the military purpose for which it was placed in position.’
Other rules provided by APII, and applicable to AVM, prohibit the use of mines
designed to explode as a consequence of the presence of a commonly available
metal detector8 and the use of self-deactivating mines equipped with anti-handling
devices capable of functioning after deactivation.9 The transfer of mines is,
in certain conditions, prohibited.10 In addition, APII requires state parties to record
all information concerning minefields11 and, without delay after the cessation of
active hostilities, to clear all mined areas.12
APII rules applicable to AVMs are weaker than those applicable to APMs.
For instance, the rule on the prohibition of use of non-detectable mines applies
only to APM.13 Similarly, the requirement to place mines within a perimeter-marked
area applies only to manually positioned APMs without self-destruction and selfneutralisation mechanisms.14

7 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices,
as amended on 3 May 1996. APII entered into force in 1998 and has 100 state parties,
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943 /(httpPages)/3CE7CFC0AA4A7548C12571C00039C
B0C?OpenDocument (accessed: 27 March 2014)
8 Art. 3.5 APII to the CCW
9 Art. 3.6 APII to the CCW
10 Art. 8.1 APII to the CCW
11 Art. 9 APII to the CCW
12 Art. 10 APII to the CCW
13 Art. 4 APII of the CCW
14 Art. 5 APII of the CCW
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Recent developments in the legal framework applicable to AVMs
in the context of CCW discussions
A number of states, international organisations and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) have continued to emphasise the widespread humanitarian
problems caused by AVMs. New requirements related to the use of AVMs,
especially in the areas of detectability, limitations on active lifetime15 and perimeter
marking, have been discussed within the framework of the CCW on different
occasions. However, the discussions did not lead to a substantive change in the
legal framework regulating AVMs.
At the Preparatory Committee for the Second Review Conference (2000–2001),
a number of states proposed a new Protocol restricting the use of AVMs. However,
an agreement was not reached in this context. Instead of adopting a new Protocol,
an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) was created, with a specific
Working Group mandated to address the issue of AVMs. At these discussions
a draft protocol on mines other than anti-personnel mines commanded a large
measure of agreement but was opposed by a small number of States Parties.
Subsequently, at the Third Review Conference of the State Parties in 2006,
several State Parties16 committed themselves to implementing the provisions in
the draft protocol on a national basis via a ‘Declaration on Anti-Vehicle Mines’.17
The commitments included: not using AVMs outside perimeter-marked areas
if the mines are not detectable or not equipped with a self-destruction or selfneutralisation mechanism and also incorporates a back-up self-deactivating
feature; not transferring AVMs in their possession unless certain conditions are
satisfied, such as, meeting the detectability and active life standards set out in
the declaration; and limiting AVM transfer to purposes of their destruction or
development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction
techniques.18

15 For example ICRC, Anti-vehicle mines: effects on humanitarian assistance and civilian
populations, presented at the Group of Governmental Experts of the States Parties to the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects,
CCW/GGE/II/WP.9 (2002)
16 Albania, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark,
El Salvador, Luxembourg, Estonia, France, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America
17 Declaration on Anti-vehicle mines, CCW/CONF.III/WP.16/Amend.2
18 Ibidem
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At the Fourth Review Conference, in December 2011, the AVM issue again featured
in discussions. At the conference opening, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations affirmed that progress in the area of AVMs would represent a significant
improvement in IHL.19 The State Parties decided to convene an open-ended
Meeting of Experts, in 2012, to further discuss the implementation of IHL with
regard to MOTAPM and to submit a report to the 2012 Meeting of the High
Contracting Parties to the Convention.20 At this Meeting of Experts on MOTAPM,
a study by the ICRC21 assessing the current status of IHL covering MOTAPM
highlighted the many challenges resulting from the lack of agreement between the
State Parties during previous discussions on this topic. In addition to the threats
of AVMs discussed above, other areas of concern included the lack of information
on implementation of article 6.3 of APII of the CCW and on the implementation of
states’ commitments and national policies, especially of those having committed
to the declaration in 2006.

19 Summary Record of the First Meeting, Fourth review conference CCW, 2011,
CCW/CONF.IV/SR.1
20 Final Document of the 4th Review Conference, 15 Dec. 2011 CCW/CONF.IC/4/Add.1
21 ICRC, Rules of international humanitarian law applicable to anti-vehicle mines,
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Meeting of Experts on Mines other than
Anti-personnel Mines (2012)
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Although the meeting was conducted in a constructive atmosphere, a small
number of states continued to insist as they had done in the 2002–2006 process
that existing IHL regulation of AVMs was sufficient, if respected. Most states
continued to stress that the humanitarian impact of AVMs called for stronger
regulation.
At the 2011 Meeting of States Parties, the discussion remained divided and a
proposal to continue work in the format of an expert meeting in 2013 was blocked
by a small number of states. AVM under the title MOTAPM has remained on the
agenda of CCW Meetings of States Parties. It was discussed at the 2013 MSP and
is listed on the draft agenda for the 2014 MSP.
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GLOBAL OVERVIEW

The full extent of AVM contamination around the world remains uncertain.
Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that AVMs continue to affect civilian
populations on a wide scale. In some states, the threat of AVMs is so extensive
that its negative effects visibly permeate civil society, affecting infrastructure
development and economic progress at many levels. For other states, the full
extent and internal impact of AVM contamination is less clear due to unwillingness
or inability to publically report on the threat. In some cases, news media provide a
basic insight into the situation by reporting on the continued occurrence of AVM
incidents and resulting civilian casualties.
This global overview section sets out the nature and specificity of available data
on the presence of AVMs internationally. It is based on what can be discerned
from open sources, as well as from the AVM basic impact survey (BIS) conducted
in the context of this study. The section also discusses how AVMs are used
internationally (both past and present), by looking at states that import AVMs or
produce them for domestic use, and states with existing AVM stocks. Expanding
on the comprehensive picture of the humanitarian and development impact of
AVMs, this section also examines data on civilian AVM casualties and reporting
procedures, as well as key development areas affected by AVMs.

CURRENT USE OF ANTI-VEHICLE MINES
AVMs were used extensively around the world throughout the 20th century and,
in some countries, new mines are still actively being laid. Some of the world’s
many AVM fields function as actively monitored military defences. However, for
the large majority of affected states, AVMs are unrecorded, unmonitored hazards
from past conflicts. They are lost to the parties that once laid them and pose a
continued threat to civilian populations.
AVMs are still widely produced and stockpiled by many countries. Around
30 countries are still believed to be producing AVMs,22 though a number may
have ceased active production (see Appendix for detailed AVM type listings by
country). In addition, there are occasional international collaborations for the joint
production of AVMs.
While there is some overlap in terms of where AVMs are produced and where
they are used, for many states, AVMs are produced elsewhere and imported.
For example, although the African continent is heavily contaminated by AVMs, other
than Egypt and South Africa, no other African countries have manufactured them.

22 Janes Mines and Mine Clearance, 2011–2012
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Pressure-fused mines target military vehicles and civilian objects and can be set
off by any object that exceeds the design’s pressure threshold. Some modern
electronic fuses use a variety of sensors, such as seismic, magnetic influence and
electronic including combined sensors, which enhance discrimination, allowing
more selective targeting of military vehicles.23 However, in terms of the AVMs that
are currently affecting post-conflict and developing states, most are older designs
with more conventional fusing frameworks.
This study found that the patterns associated with the intended military use
of AVMs were actually quite rare in the case study countries of Afghanistan,
Cambodia and South Sudan. This was due to the weapons being used by
untrained or guerrilla forces. In these countries, combatants in general did not
receive sufficient training in landmine warfare. Therefore, the laying of AVMs
was done irregularly and often targeted areas and roads deemed important for
enemy vehicles transporting supplies and troops. As a result, when making
contamination assessments, mine action programmes in these countries are very
careful not to rely too heavily on concepts involving traditional military strategies
for laying AVMs.
An additional challenge is that many of these AVM users kept no records of where
the mines are laid as required by the CCW. In many cases, this is because they
have neither the necessary training nor the resources to create and maintain maps
or record emplacement coordinates. In other cases, sometimes belligerents did
not believe keeping records of AVM locations was important, and sometimes they
have seen keeping maps of the mines as a strategic vulnerability that could not be
afforded in case the opposing force acquired them.
23 IHS Janes, Mines & EOD Operational Guide – AT Blast Mines, March 2014
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AVMs IN NAGORNO KARABAKH: PERSPECTIVE FROM A MINE
ACTION OPERATOR 24

FIGURE 1

The Nagorno Karabakh (NK) region between Armenia and Azerbaijan is home
to approximately 150,000 inhabitants. During the war (1988–1994), mines
were laid in NK by both countries near strategic positions, but remain until
this day a danger to the civilian population. All of registered AVM victims in
NK are males. However, the effects of this are felt more widely. Families often
lose their only source of income when the male head of the family is involved
in an accident. Secondary losses include the loss of farming and cultivating
equipment, medical costs and years of financial debt.
Registred anti-vehicle mine accidents and casualties in NK and green
zone, 1995–2014
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Areas of anti-vehicle mine accident, 1995–2014

field
road
vinyard
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Approximately 51% of AVM accidents occur
in fields during cultivation or other farming
activities. Around 36% of accidents take
place on or near roads. Although fewer
accidents occur in other locations, they
nonetheless cause significant damage.
For instance, vineyards and forests are
sources of income for local populations.
Accidents taking place in such locations can
deter populations from using the areas and
their surroundings.

24 All of the information in this section is based on reports registered by The HALO Trust and refers
to the post-war years from 1995 until the present. The information does not include every single
AVM accident in Nagorno Karabakh, but does give a concrete representation of the situation.
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Activity of the victim when the accident occurred, 1995–2014
farming
collecting metal
driving
working
gathering wood

Information from registered cases
indicates that the vast majority
of victims were carrying out
economic, work-related activities
when the accident occurred.

military
other (grazing,
horseback, demining)

Results of anti-vehicle mine accidents, 1995–2014
(percentage of HALO registered cases)

death
head
leg
hand
other

Source: HALO Trust

Around 38% of accidents are
fatal. Another 38% result in leg
injuries, often leading to ampu
tations. Head injuries account
for 20% of accidents while hand
injuries account for 7% of accidents. It is necessary to note that
the victims typically suffer from
a combination of the abovementioned injuries.

AVAILABILITY AND NATURE OF DATA ON ANTI-VEHICLE
MINE PRESENCE
State reports, historical records, databases, news media and other open sources
form the basis of our understanding of the extent of AVM contamination
worldwide. Although much information on AVM use and production is not
released in the public domain, by using a variety of open sources, this study
provides a basic understanding of the large number of states that have been,
or continue to be, involved with AVMs. Reasons for this could be active military
use or training, prior use on their territories, active or past production of AVMs,
or because of continued reports of AVM related casualties (see Figure 2).
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STATE INVOLVEMENT WITH AVMs AS REPORTED IN OPEN SOURCES

FIGURE 2

States are listed by the following sources for the specified reasons. See each
source for more details.
1. Landmine Monitor report on ‘The Humanitarian Impact of Anti-vehicle Mines’,
2012, listing states with anti-vehicle mine casualties, new use of AVMs from
1999–2011, or past use of anti-vehicle mines prior to 1999.
2. Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance, 2008, listing states affected by anti-vehicle
mines
3. Canadian Forces Mine Database, 2009, listing states with stocks of anti-vehicle
mines for training, testing, or military use
4. News articles on recently found anti-vehicle mine contamination or recent
anti-vehicle mine-related casualties, 2010–2014
5. Reported producers of anti-vehicle mines (historic and current) according
to Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance, 2011–2012
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Information is thus available to help identify which countries have AVMs on
their territories. However, a number of hurdles or uncertainties remain, and
these have made it thus far impossible to assess the full extent of global AVM
contamination.
The first hurdle is the absence of public reporting in certain affected states.
For example, in some countries, civil news media continue to report on the
occurrence of suspected AVM-related casualties (both military and civilian), but
the government does not provide information in the public domain on existing
AVMs, and it is not known whether information on contamination and casualties
is being collected in a systematic way. A second uncertainty is the inability
of certain affected states to measure the extent of contamination due to the
absence of mine laying records. In a few other cases, in addition to the absence
of historical records, current AVM contamination in on-going conflicts goes
unrecorded. A third uncertainty is that some states, while facing an evident AVM
threat, have not yet been able to conduct a countrywide survey to determine
its full extent. A fourth reason for uncertainty, at both global and national levels,
is the undifferentiated nature of reporting mechanisms where national data
does not differentiate between APMs and AVMs, but rather groups landmines
together.
To gain a deeper understanding of these data availability and collection
challenges, this study conducted a BIS of affected states. The survey assessed
data collection practices surrounding AVM contamination and casualties, and
also asked states to specify the impact on different aspects of development
using a four-point scale.
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The BIS results revealed a number of trends in the areas of contamination data
and the nature of national data collection practices. A significant reason for
uncertainty in contamination data is the fact that states did not adequately
distinguish between AVMs and APMs across their data aggregation and
reporting processes. The survey asked states to specify their knowledge of
the extent of AVM contamination and provide estimates at varying levels of
specificity. The survey found that among those states that reported continuing
AVM contamination, only about half were able to provide an estimate of AVM
presence in each of the requested categories. A common reason for the lack of
an estimate, or uncertainty in a given estimate, was that nationally aggregated
data did not differentiate between APMs and AVMs. The case study components
helped the authors learn that there are a number of possible reasons for this
lack of data differentiation, including the format of national survey processes,
national data handling procedures and the format of reporting forms used to
collect contamination and casualty information.

ANTI-VEHICLE MINE CASUALTY DATA
Although AVMs are designed to destroy armoured military vehicles, they
continue to pose an indiscriminate threat, killing and injuring civilians driving
standard motor vehicles, agricultural equipment and construction equipment.
This section discusses globally available data on civilian casualties resulting from
AVMs. Further details on the types and patterns in AVM casualties are discussed
in the contexts of the country case studies.
Beyond the reporting efforts of international networks like ICBL, current knowledge of civilian casualties caused by AVMs comes from two primary sources:
(i) coverage of incidents by the news media; and (ii) figures provided by states
(typically only from those with established mine action programmes). The sources
themselves vary greatly from state to state. The study found that while both
sources of information help to provide a rough indication of the impact of AVMs
on civilians, both remain incomplete.
A significant number of AVM-related civilian casualties continue to be reported
in the news media. As a part of this study, the research team collected news
items on AVM casualties and recent contamination discoveries (January 2010 –
May 2014). Casualty incident news items were included either because the
reporter specifically identified the accident as AVM-related or because the
signatures described in the article were strongly indicative of an AVM-related
accident. A total of 190 incidents and 725 casualties were recorded during
this time period.
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FIGURE 3

NEWS REPORTS OF AVM DISCOVERIES AND CASUALTIES, 2010–2014

© GICHD – SIPRI
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It is important to recognise that, for a number of reasons, news media reports
probably only provide a small part of the full picture of the impact on casualties.
Importantly, AVMs are often used in open countryside rather than in densely
populated or built-up areas. Open countryside is usually occupied by small rural
communities using the land for agriculture or other related purposes. Given that
the majority of rural populations in developing countries are not regularly covered
by the media, it is unlikely that deaths or injuries from mines in these areas would
make it into national news unless the incident was particularly large or significant
(e.g. a bus). Even in cases where accidents are reported, journalists are not always
able to distinguish an AVM incident from other weapons, sometimes terming an
event as a roadside explosion or even mistakenly as a rocket-propelled grenade
(RPG) or IED attack. Further confusion can result from the fact that the explosion
of an AVM can cause most traces of the item to disappear.
State reporting about AVM-related civilian casualties is an even more important
data resource, yet it remains insufficient on a number of levels. In the most
severe cases, states with suspected casualties resulting from AVMs release no
information at all, and it is unknown whether the government systematically
collects casualty information.
In other cases, state reporting on AVM-related civilian casualties is actively
conducted as a part mine action programmes, but reporting remains incomplete
due to an inability to cover or access all areas of the country. In some cases,
reporting is incomplete because of the nature of data collection procedures and too
much ‘freedom’ for authors describing incidents. This issue is illustrated in more
depth in the case studies where mine action personnel can enter a number of terms
into a victim or incident report (e.g. AVM, anti-tank mine, AT, ATM, etc.), making
it difficult to later sift out aggregated AVM statistics from a national database.
Another important reason why national AVM casualty counts are likely to be
incomplete is the lack of historical records of such casualties during periods of
conflict. The BIS asked states to provide total civilian casualty counts from AVMs
on a year-by-year basis for as far back as their records could go. In nearly all cases,
casualty counts in earlier years were significantly lower than those from more
recent years. In particular, for many states, annual casualty counts rose significantly
upon the establishment of a mine action programme: the increase in casualty
figures is due to better data collection rather than an actual increase in casualties.
Figure 4 shows the total numbers of AVM-related civilian casualties from states
responding to the BIS. For the reasons described here, the majority of states noted
in their responses that actual casualty figures (versus recorded casualty figures)
are likely to be significantly higher.
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FIGURE 4

INCOMPLETE AVM CASUALTIES REPORTED BY STATES
THAT PARTICIPATED IN THE BIS
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DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACT OF ANTI-VEHICLE MINES
Study findings show that the negative impact of AVMs has a significant
potential to increase precisely when a state is progressing in its post-conflict
recovery and development efforts. This effect is made dramatically worse
by low metal content AVMs. This section briefly describes these trends, and
illustrates them in further detail in the Afghanistan, Cambodia and South Sudan
case studies.
Due to higher pressure thresholds, AVMs are unlikely to be triggered by people
on foot or non-mechanised farming, as APMs are. When displaced communities
begin to return to areas mined during conflict, any threats from APMs or
explosive remnants of war (ERW) quickly become apparent during resettlement
or subsistence farming; AVMs are more likely to go unnoticed and pose a latent
threat to future development efforts.
This increasing development impact of AVMs can best be explained using a
concept of various triggers that occur as a state moves from a situation of conflict
to one of active economic development. Such triggers include the return of
internally displaced persons (IDPs) to contaminated land, followed by construction
efforts involving heavy machinery; the transition from subsistence farming using
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manual labour to mechanised farming with tractors or heavy ploughs; increases
in the number of vehicles per capita for both farming and transportation;
or development close to newly cleared roads.

FIGURE 5

		

DEVELOPMENT ‘TRIGGERS’ INCREASING THE IMPACT
OF LATENT AVMs

Conflict or initial post
conflict situation

Development triggers leading to increases
in AVM casualties or contamination
discoveries

Communities displaced during conflict;
area mined or contaminated by ERW

Return of population or newly settling IDPs
followed by construction efforts involving
heavy machinery

Subsistence farming or livestock herding

Mechanised farming

Population uses few vehicles

More vehicles used for both farming
and transportation

Roads cleared to width of only 8m
during emergency humanitarian
demining

Development occurs in newly accessible areas

Old roads, mined during conflict,
followed by overgrowth of these roads
from lack of use

Development of this land for agriculture
or infrastructure
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Low metal content AVMs have been shown to significantly increase these effects.
They are a greater long-term hazard to, and inhibitor of, developmental progress
than low metal content APMs. This is due to the greater likelihood of these
mines being overlooked until a state begins to advance in the use of mechanised
construction or farming.
Through the BIS, states reported a wide variety of ways in which AVMs had
had an impact on communities and development efforts. The survey provided
a number of components of development to select from, as well as an option to
describe further unlisted components. States were then asked to rank the impact
of AVMs on these as un-significant, moderate, severe or very severe. Figure 6
shows the components of development which states ranked as suffering the most
severe impacts from AVMs. There was a strong correlation between the scores
for restoration of land for agriculture, getting roads back into use and restoring
land for grazing livestock.
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FIGURE 6

THE TOP IMPACT AREAS OF AVMs ON COMPONENTS
OF DEVELOPMENT AS IDENTIFIED BY 10 STATES

States were asked to indicate whether AVMs had had a negative impact on a list
of components of development.
The following scoring system was used to calculate the results: no significant
impact: 0 points; moderate impact: 1 point; severe impact: 2 points; very severe
impact: 3 points.
The results below combine states’ responses and demonstrate each aspect’s total score.
Aspect

Score

Restoration of land for agriculture

17

Road reconstruction

16

Restoration of land for grazing livestock

15

Road access for construction

15

New roads

14

Road access for returning refugees

14

Road access for humanitarian aid

13

Development of new land for agriculture

13

Bridge reconstruction

13

Power grid reconstruction

12
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Farmer’s truck following an AVM accident in Angola.
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QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF AVMs ON TRANSPORT
COSTS AND TIME
On average, World Food Progamme (WFP) assists 80 million people per year
in over 75 different countries, distributing food to victims of war, civil
conflict and natural disasters. To accomplish this, the WFP has developed
logistics resources and expertise that are unparalleled in the humanitarian
sector and are often called on by other humanitarian organisations.
On any given day, WFP operates an average of 5,000 trucks worldwide;
land transport is its most common delivery method (95.5 per cent of its
4 million metric tonnes of food is delivered by road). When roads to remote
locations are blocked by flooding, landslides or AVMs, airdrops are often
the only viable alternative, but they can cost up to 100 times more per
kg/km. When a number of road options are available, new techniques using
Geographic Information Systems allow delivery costs using different routes
to be simulated and quantified.

FIGURE 7

DELIVERY ROUTES
WAREHOUSES

Mekele
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Addis Abeba
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Kembolcha
Robe
Gode
Bahir Dar
Asosa
Gambela
ROUTE 1

Source: WFP
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WFP first experimented with this method in Ethiopia in 2007. Having compiled
an extensive geographic database of roads, warehouses and delivery points,
it was able to simulate road closures and quantify changes in travel time, just
as a standard car navigation system can pick one route over another. Results
based on hypothetical data are displayed below:
Figure 7 shows the optimal allocation of delivery points (small dots) to a
number of warehouses (large dots) throughout Ethiopia. In this configuration,
overall travel time to all delivery points is minimised. In the Somali region of
Ethiopia (southeast) total travel time to delivery points from their respective
nearest warehouses (Dire Dawa and Gode) amounts to 1,050 hours, or an
average of 5 hours per delivery.
Figure 8 illustrates hypothetical AVMs (shown as red crosses) laid on routes
leading out of Gode. Only one road, leading southwest, is left open and
the effect on the allocation of delivery points to warehouses is significant;
FIGURE 8

DELIVERY ROUTES WITH HYPOTETHICAL AVMs
WAREHOUSES
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Source: WFP
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to remain as efficient as possible, most of Gode’s previous delivery points
must be reallocated to either Dire Dawa or Robe. This translates into an
increase in total travel time of 300 hours, or an increase in travel costs of
approximately 30 per cent.
This example goes some way towards showing the concrete cost effects of
AVMs on the delivery of relief aid. Further research using this technique is
warranted in order to carry out a quantitative cost-benefit analysis of AVM
clearance.
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CASE STUDIES

AFGHANISTAN
As foreign troops begin to withdraw from Afghanistan after over a decade
of conflict, and as the government works to stabilise the country, its efforts
continue to be challenged by insurgent activity and unrest in many regions.
At the same time, Afghanistan is pursuing economic progress and development
as its population works to resettle and rebuild. The government is taking on new
infrastructure projects such as railroads linking the country with its neighbours,
and there are new foreign investment projects in sectors such as mineral extraction
that will bring in much needed national income.
Landmines, both AVM and APM, continue to affect these attempts to regain
stability and move beyond the country’s difficult past. A new survey process
has revealed that AVMs are present in the majority of the remaining landminecontaminated areas. Across Afghanistan, the need for land is increasing. This study
illustrates how AVMs contribute to prolonging poverty by denying access to land
and transport, and by perpetuating the state of civil unrest that continues to affect
Afghans, the surrounding region and the international community.
Afghanistan became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2003 and is in the
process of developing national implementation legislation.25 It signed the CCW
in April 1981, but has never ratified the Convention, and so is not a party to the
CCW or its protocols.
The Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), the Department of
Mine Clearance under the Afghan National Disaster Management Authority, and
HALO Trust provided instrumental support in assembling this case study.

At least 18 people were killed and seven others were injured in two landmine
explosions in Shena Rai area of Afghanistan, in July 2012. The first accident
occurred when a car on its way from Chaman to Spin Boldak hit an AVM.
A truck carrying 25 people was sent to rescue the victims, but it too detonated
an AVM. The fatalities included women and children. 26

25 Landmine Monitor, Afghanistan Country Profile, Mine Ban Policy, page updated as of
2 October 2012, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/1552
26 Source: http://paktribune.com/news/Landmine-blasts-kill-18-near-Chaman-border-251314.html
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Overview of anti-vehicle mine presence
Given the vast areas of land that have been contaminated since 1979, landmines
continue to have an impact on the country at large. Although APMs significantly
outnumber AVMs, the majority of land affected by mines in Afghanistan includes
AVMs. Accordingly, in implementing the Mine Ban Treaty in Afghanistan, the
government reported that the presence of many high priority AVM-contaminated
areas required a focus on both AVMs and APMs.27
As of 2013, there were 4,876 landmine and ERW hazards covering over 544 square
kilometres of Afghanistan. These hazards are located in 1,688 communities,
244 districts and 33 provinces, directly affecting 1,313,341 people. These hazards
are summarised in Afghanistan’s request for an extension of the deadline for
completing the destruction of APMs in mined areas, in accordance with Article 5
of the Mine Ban Treaty.28

FIGURE 9

REMAINING CONTAMINATION AS OF THE END OF MARCH 2013 29
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Source: MAPA

The vast majority of AVMs in Afghanistan were laid by the Mujahedeen against the
forces of the former Soviet Union during its decade-long occupation (1979–88).30
Owing to the Mudjahedeen’s guerrilla-style resistance, many mines were laid in
irregular and sporadic ways, and most minefields were not recorded.

27 Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Request for an extension of the deadline
for completing the destruction of APMs in mined areas in accordance with Article 5 under the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of APMs and
on Their Destruction, 31 August 2012, http://www.macca.org.af/macca/?page_id=171, p. 7
28 Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan Ottawa Proposal YR 1 and YR 2
29 MAPA Annual Report 1391, http://www.macca.org.af/en/MAPA_Reports.html, p. 33
30 Interview with HALO Trust, March 2014
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AVM contamination in Afghanistan is distributed in regional concentrations
due to the nature of the Soviet conflict, as is described in greater detail later.
The central region has the greatest number of AVM fields. However, the amount
of land affected by AVMs is greatest in the south due to more scattered and
widespread use of AVMs across large areas. The eastern and northern regions are
notably less affected by AVMs than other regions due to the nature of the conflict
during the Soviet occupation.31

FIGURE 10

CURRENT AVM AND APM PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

Source: MACCA

National data collection system
The picture of landmine contamination in Afghanistan is changing, not necessarily
because more mines are being laid, but rather because the data is improving
through further assessments. Starting in 1993, Afghanistan conducted
non-technical surveys of landmine contamination, but for different reasons
(including both methodological issues and obstacles faced by surveyors), they
were unable to capture a comprehensive national picture of contamination.

31 Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan Ottawa Proposal YR 1 and YR 2, p. 33
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The first baseline data-set was provided by the 2003 Landmine Impact Survey.
A second attempt was made in the form of the 2009 Polygon survey.
In 2012, because landmine accidents were still occurring in areas thought to be
clear on the basis of the earlier surveys, Afghanistan began conducting a new
survey with a more comprehensive methodology. The Mine and ERW Impact
Free Community Survey (MEIFCS) goes far beyond the reach of past surveys by
visiting every community in Afghanistan, rather than only the communities noted
as affected in the current database. This survey process was due to be to complete
in early 2014. However, efforts have been significantly slowed as surveyors
encountered large numbers of communities not listed in national census data.
MEIFCS reports showed that out of the 32,500 communities listed in the base
census, only 13,000 had so far been surveyed, yet another 18,000 communities
had been surveyed which were not in the base census.32 These challenges mean
that Afghanistan will clearly need more time to complete the survey.
The current survey effort is being conducted using the country’s standard Hazard
Report form, which allows surveyors to differentiate between AVM, APM and
ERW threats and whether they are new or known hazards. The Mine Action
Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) manages these reports within the
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). Regional survey
teams collect data on mines and ERW and send them to the national authority.
Regional offices and community liaison teams also report to MACCA based on
routine data collection visits and procedures.
MACCA reports that AVMs have consistently posed identification challenges
throughout the various national survey efforts. The presence of APMs is often
much more visible, as incidents involve both humans and livestock, thus alerting
communities to the threat. However, MACCA reports that people can often be
found using the land concealing AVMs as part of their residence or for shallow
farming without knowledge of their presence.33 Only when construction or use of
farming vehicles uncover or set off an AVM are civilians alerted to their presence.
Over the past 18 years, the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA)
has cleared almost two-thirds of all the suspected hazards discovered to date,
including all known contamination within urban areas. However, many areas of
the country are still inaccessible due to on-going conflicts and the absence of
usable roads. New hazards are discovered every year due to: (i) on-going conflicts;
32 Interview with Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan, March 2014
33 Interview with Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan, Directorate of Mine Clearance,
March 2014
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(ii) survey teams gaining access to previously insecure areas, and; (iii) the return or
resettlement of IDPs to new or abandoned communities. As a result, the number
of remaining suspected hazardous areas (SHA) including AVMs, APMs and ERW
has continued to grow for over a decade, despite the clearance achievements.34
The MACCA map below depicts evidence of this growing picture of contamination
with a newly identified AVM and APM mixed minefield discovered in December
2013. These newly identified hazards in Nimroz province in Southern Afghanistan
were reported to and surveyed by the Mine/ERW Impact Free Community Survey
(MEIFCS). This was the first time mine action teams visited this area since its
contamination. Reportedly, these mines were laid over 3 million square meters in
1993-1994 by the Iranian army inside the Afghan soil. Mines are mainly AVMs with
APMs used as fuses, and many of the mines were made visible via soil erosion.
MACCA reports that these mines have caused a number of civilian casualties.35

|
|
|

Accident to a local vehicle in the newly
discovered AVM and APM contaminated area
of Nimroz province.

34 MAPA 2008-2013 Strategy, http://macca.org.af/en/mapa_plans.html
35 Email communication with MACCA, Area Manager, Regional Office Kandahar, 13 March 2014
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MACCA map depicting the location of the recently
discovered AVM-APM mixed minefield covering
roughly 3 million square m.

|
|

APMs being used as fuses for AVMs throughout
the contaminated area.
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APMs and AVMs exposed by soil movements
in Nimroz province in December 2013.

History of anti-vehicle mine use
The proliferation of AVMs in Afghanistan began with the Mujahedeen guerrilla
resistance to the Soviet Union’s invasion in 1979 and occupation until 1988.
The Mujahedeen used AVMs against Soviet troops in attempts to disrupt the
movements of tanks and convoys. While the Soviet Union used APMs liberally,
they did not often resort to the use of AVMs because the Mujahedeen possessed
or used few heavy vehicles other than those captured from the Soviets themselves.
The landmines used by the Mujahedeen were acquired from foreign countries
with an interest in defeating the Soviet Union. The United States in particular
channelled many weapons, including AVMs, to the Mujahedeen through Pakistan.
The Pakistanis were charged with ensuring the delivery of mines through supply
channels along its long and porous border with Afghanistan. AVMs including M19
mines from the United States, TC6 mines from Italy and P2 mines from Pakistan
were channelled to the Mujahedeen in this way. The Mujahedeen also received
support from Iran as YM-II and YM-III AVMs were supplied to forces operating
from the western province of Herat.
54
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The nature of the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan helps to explain
the pattern of AVM contamination across the country. The Soviet Union’s main
command and control centre operated out of Kabul, which is why the Mujahedeen
concentrated on laying AVMs, both in belts and irregularly, around the city. There
were three main security belts around the city, the third of which extended
far south.36
In addition to mine concentrations in the centre of the country, due to the extensive
assistance to the Mujahedeen via Pakistan, skirmishes were also common in the
southern regions of Afghanistan, as the Soviets sought to disrupt supply channels
and starve Mujahedeen forces. The unique flatness of the terrain in the south made
it suitable for vehicles and mine laying. In order to create barriers against Soviet
advances, the Mujahedeen would lay AVMs in wide, dispersed and often irregular
formations. The southern region of Afghanistan remains the area most widely
contaminated by AVMs. Current landmine contamination in Loghar province,
located south of Kabul, leading to Pakistan and an important trade route, consists
of 85 per cent AVM contamination.37
Similar interactions and AVM-laying occurred to a lesser extent in the western
regions, as the Soviets sought to starve the Mujahedeen of Iranian assistance.
To this day, there remains significant AVM contamination near the Iranian border
as well as in Herat province.
When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, many predicted that
the communist government of Afghanistan, known as the Najibullah regime, would
fall within a matter of months. However, these predictions failed to account for the
fact that the regime remained well equipped with military hardware and resources
provided by the Soviet Union.
Najibullah’s government continued to survive, largely by holding on to a reduced
territory, concentrating on urban areas and keeping main communication routes
open.38 During this period of resistance, mine laying was being carried out by
both the Najibullah regime and the Mujahedeen, who were also fighting amongst
themselves by this time.39

36 Interview with HALO Trust, March 2014
37 Ibidem
38 Clements, Frank. Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO,
Santa Barbara, 2003. P. XXV
39 HALO Trust Afghanistan, http://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/afghanistan
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All defending forces laid landmines to protect their main supply routes (particularly
the road north from Kabul to the old Soviet border), their airfields, military posts
around key towns, and the actual front lines. The geography of the conflict meant
that different factions frequently mined the same areas at different times.40

FIGURE 11

COMMON AVMs FOUND IN AFGHANISTAN,
BY MANUFACTURING COUNTRY
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Most recently, AVMs were also laid by the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.41
The Afghan government reports that after the fall of the pro-Soviet regime,
extensive and indiscriminate use of APM and AVM continued as the Taliban,
having developed into a significant politico-religious force, clashed with the
Northern Alliance.42 In 2008, dozens of landmines were discovered in Arghandab
District, in the southern province of Kandahar, where fighting occurred between
Taliban insurgents and the Afghan army backed by international forces.

40 HALO Trust Afghanistan, http://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/afghanistan
41 Ibidem
42 Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Request for an extension of the deadline
for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance with
Article 5 under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 31 August 2012,
http://www.macca.org.af/macca/?page_id=171, p. 4
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The Afghan Ministry of Defence reported that the Taliban had laid landmines –
AVM and APM – on roads and footpaths in Arghandab District, despite a stated
commitment not to use APMs.43
A significant proportion of the mines used in the Afghan conflicts were minimum
metal AVMs, often made of plastic casings with only a small amount of metal
used for the fusing. This fact, combined with disorganised use of the mines and
a lack of record-keeping, has contributed to the severity of the challenges faced
by mine action efforts in Afghanistan.

Casualties from anti-vehicle mines
Afghanistan’s system for collecting data on casualties from landmines and ERW
relies on a network of a variety of actors, ranging from hospitals and clinics to
community centres and schools. The actual data collection is conducted by
MACCA’s regional offices, and the process is supported by the Afghan Red Crescent
Society.44 In practice, this means that mine action personnel may be dispatched
directly to an accident, if it is promptly reported, or alternatively, they will visit
places such as health clinics to collect the data in batches. In all cases, mine action
personnel are required to fill out a Victim Form specifying the details of the case.
MACCA reports that its database contains records of more than 1,200 civilian
casualties, between 1979 and 2013, directly attributable to AVMs.45 MACCA
underlines that these numbers are drastically incomplete due to poor record
keeping during the Soviet Union’s invasion, the ensuing Afghan civil war, and even
today as many areas of the country remain inaccessible to mine action personnel
for security reasons.

43 Afghanistan: Landmines impede civilians’ return to volatile Arghandab », Irin News, 22 June
2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report/78869/afghanistan-landmines-impede-civiliansreturn-to- volatile-arghandab
44 Interview with Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan, 9 March 2014
45 SIPRI-GICHD AVM Basic Impact Survey Responses from Mine Action Coordination
Centre of Afghanistan
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AFGHANISTAN’S REPORTED AVM CASUALTY DATA AS OF SEPTEMBER

FIGURE 12

2013, WITH EARLY RECORDS SHOWING INCOMPLETE FIGURES

160

150

140

120

130

110

90

100

70

80

60

50

40

20

19
8
3
19
8
5
19
87
19
8
9
19
91
19
9
3
19
9
5
19
97
19
9
9
20
01
20
0
3
20
0
5
20
07
20
0
9
20
11
20
13

Case studies

30

0

19
81

|

10

19
79

Source: MACCA

58

In addition to a lack of security and inaccessibility, there are further reasons why
Afghanistan’s national casualty figures are incomplete. In many cases, victims
of a landmine or ERW incident may be transported to better health facilities in
nearby Iran or Pakistan. MACCA reports that this is likely to be a common trend
given the heavy mine contamination near the Iranian and Pakistani borders.
When this happens, casualty data does not make it back to Afghan health
clinics and MACCA’s regional offices do not collect it. Another cultural reason
for possible missing data is that if victims of a mine accident are killed rather
than injured – which is often the case with AVM incidents – Afghan families will
often immediately hold a funeral and enter the familial grieving process without
contacting authorities to investigate. MACCA suspects that much data goes
uncollected for this reason.46
Casualties from AVMs are still occurring across Afghanistan today, especially in
the most heavily mined central, southern and western regions. While much of
the area surrounding Kabul has been demined, Loghar province, in the south of
the central region, remains heavily contaminated by AVMs, and tractor drivers
are common AVM victims due to the growing agricultural activity in this region.
In the southern regions, Kuchi nomadic families traversing the desert landscape
are common victims of AVMs. The families use large mules and camels to travel
or transport goods, the patriarch often leading an animal while his family rides
on top. The weight of the animal carrying passengers or goods is often enough
to trigger AVMs.
A significant civilian casualty factor that is relatively unique to Afghanistan is the
use of pressure-plated improvised explosive devices (PP-IEDs). In February and
July 2012, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that
armed groups in Afghanistan were deploying large numbers of these explosive
devices.47 In 2011, UNAMA reported that the majority of PP-IEDs are designed to
detonate from approximately 10kg of pressure and frequently contain up to 20kg of
explosive, more than twice that of a standard AVM. As a result of this design, these
explosive weapons ‘effectively act as a massive anti-personnel landmine with

46 Interview with Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan, 9 March 2014
47 UNAMA, ‘Afghanistan, Annual Report 2011, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,’
February 2012, p. 3, www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNAMA POC
2011 Report_Final_Feb 2012.pdf; and ‘Afghanistan Mid-year Report on Protection of
Civilians in Armed Conflict: 2012,’ July 2012, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/
UNAMAMidYearReport2012.pdf; reported by Landmine Monitor, Afghanistan Country Profile,
Mine Ban Policy, page updated as of 2 October 2012, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/
cp/display/region_profiles/theme/1552
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the capability of destroying a tank; civilians who step or drive over these IEDs have
no defence against them and little chance of survival. Additionally a significant
number of IEDs are encountered with explosive weight of approximately 2–4kg
specifically designed to maim or kill individuals on foot.’48
In 2012, UNAMA documented 913 civilian casualties (393 civilian deaths and
520 injured) from PP-IEDs. In 2013, use of PP-IEDs resulted in 557 civilian
casualties (245 civilian deaths and 312 injured), a decline of 39 per cent. While
the decrease is noted, UNAMA reports that the human cost of PP-IED attacks
in 2013 remained high. PP-IEDs were detonated in public areas used by civilians
such as roads, markets, government offices, schools and bus stations. UNAMA
reaffirmed in its 2013 report that PP-IEDs are indiscriminate and reinforced its call
to end their use.49

Developmental impact of anti-vehicle mines
Across Afghanistan, the need for land is increasing. Decades of conflict and
unrest have devastated the country, with landmines continuing to deny access
to valuable land and resources. The agricultural sector is particularly important to
Afghanistan’s recovery and growth – agriculture is the main source of livelihood
and subsistence for roughly 75 per cent of the Afghan population, and a crucial
component to enhance food security and drive economic growth for the entire
country.50
Across numerous sectors, the Government reported in its 2012 Mine Ban
Treaty Article 5 Extension Request that the socio-economic impact of landmine
contamination remains severe:
‘The presence of landmines resulted in reducing crop production, increasing
transportation costs, and adding obstacles to repatriation and rehabilitation.
Furthermore, about 8,300 public buildings such as schools, health
facilities and factories were unusable due to the presence of mines.

48 UNAMA, ‘Afghanistan Mid-year Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 2012,’
July 2012, pp. 13-14, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/UNAMAMidYearReport
2012.pdf; reported by Landmine Monitor, Afghanistan Country Profile, Mine Ban Policy, page
updated as of 2 October 2012, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_
profiles/theme/1552
49 UNAMA, ‘Afghanistan, Annual Report 2011, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,’
February 2012, p. 3
50 USAID, Afghanistan, Agriculture, http://www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/agriculture
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More than 228 sq km of productive agricultural land had been blocked due to the
presence of landmines. The productivity lost due to this blockage was estimated
to be valued at USD 11.5 million per year. Landmines laid on and around roads
– placed by warring factions to disrupt and prevent rival forces from advancing –
led to severe restrictions to transportation, making the delivery and movement of
goods more difficult and costly; there was an estimated loss of more than USD
26 million due to increased transportation costs and extended travel times.’ 51
Some experts and community leaders have warned that the full extent of the AVM
threat in Afghanistan has yet to be realised. It has been suggested that the greatest
intensity of AVM use was on village-level roads. Many of these areas are not yet
being reached by aid agencies because the general security situation makes it
too risky. As one observer reported, ‘The main roads have never really been the
issue, it’s the smaller ones, especially those that didn’t see much in the way of
Kabul government/Soviet control. On these roads they used AVMs as a nuisance,
for protection, to deny them to the enemy.’ 52
FIGURE 13

		

MACCA RATED THE FOLLOWING AREAS AS SUFFERING
‘VERY SEVERE’ EFFECTS DUE TO AVMs IN THE BIS

Road access for humanitarian aid
Road access for health care
Road access for refugee return
Road access for construction
Housing reconstruction
Road reconstruction and new road construction
Bridge reconstruction
New housing construction
Restoration of land for agriculture and development of new agriculture areas
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Restoration of land for grazing livestock

51 Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Request for an extension of the deadline
for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance
with Article 5 under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 31 August 2012,
http://www.macca.org.af/macca/?page_id=171, p. 4
52 Anti-vehicle mines: Understanding the impact and managing the risk. Landmine action,
p. 17, http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/AVMs%20Understanding%20the%20
impact%20and%20managing%20the%20risk(1).pdf
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Beyond denying access to land for agriculture, AVMs continue to affect Afghan
develop efforts across a number of other areas. The following examples detail
ways that AVMs have affected resettlement efforts, national infrastructure
development, and natural resource development.
Impact Example 1: Missed low-metal anti-vehicle mines in Jebrail
A recent example in Jebrail, a suburb of Herat City in western Afghanistan,
underlines the severe challenge that minimum metal AVMs pose to civilians
attempting to resettle and develop land. Between 1979 and 1989, the Mujahedeen
laid many AVMs in the area, namely Iranian copies of the US M19 and the Italian
TC6. From 1990 to 2008, when the conflict was over, various humanitarian
demining agencies carried out clearance in the area, finding and destroying 116
AVMs. After clearance, Jebrail became increasingly populated with returnees and
IDPs from Herat City and nearby Iran, and the area was actively developed with
new housing and infrastructure projects. However, during this time, occupants
found that many minimum metal AVMs had been missed by clearance operations.
Between 2010 and 2013, HALO Trust conducted a re-clearance of Jebrail; a task
covering 2,386,723m2. HALO reported facing numerous challenges during this work,
all compounded by the minimum metal content and low detectability threshold of
the AVM types in the area. Additional challenges included: the area’s construction

|
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Demining efforts in Jebrail.

boom and the inability to conduct mechanical clearance over in large areas; the
unexpectedly large amounts of scrap metal creating false signals; the underground
infrastructure (incl. water pipes and electricity cables) which precluded the use of
mechanical excavation (and metal detectors in the case of electricity cables) and
required careful manual excavation; and electrical currents which interfered with
detectors, requiring full manual excavation or mechanical clearance.
Upon completion of its operations, HALO had discovered an additional 11 AVMs
that had been missed by earlier clearance efforts. Part of HALO’s success could
be attributed to novel detection methods, such as ground penetrating radar and
custom built machinery for mechanical clearance – advances that HALO and other
deminers across Afghanistan have been forced to develop in the face of the threat
of minimum metal mines. Dealing with minimum metal AVMs in Afghanistan has
been described as a process of constant learning and evolution. As a result of
clearance efforts in Jebrail, a reported 22,215 families will benefit from immediate
use of the area, and an additional 69,655 as indirect beneficiaries in the local area.
Impact Example 2: Northern Afghanistan railway project
AVMs have posed major challenges for large-scale infrastructure development in
Afghanistan. Since 2010, Afghanistan has engaged in cooperative international
projects to develop rail systems connecting Afghanistan with the rest of the region.
Afghanistan’s central location gives it the potential to become an important hub for
the transportation of goods to Central Asia, Pakistan, Southeast Asia and Europe.
Railway projects are seen as a way to provide a more reliable and cost-effective
option than road transport, helping Afghanistan unlock its mineral and agricultural
wealth and lift more of its regions out of poverty.
The Hairatan-Uzbekistan rail project was the first substantial common-carrier
railroad project in Afghanistan. Construction started in January 2010 and the 75 km
rail link in now operational, connecting Hairatan on the Uzbekistan-Afghan border
to the city of Mazar-i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. The project began under the
auspices of the Afghan Ministry of Public Works and was planned, developed by
and contracted to Uzbekistan Railways (UTY). The project’s estimated cost was
USD 170 million, of which USD 165 million was provided by the Asian Development
Bank (ADB). The remaining USD 5 million was provided by the Afghan Government.
The Hairatan-Uzbekistan project is part of the transport strategy and action plan of
the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Programme and aims to boost
freight volumes and the profile of Afghanistan as a transit hub.53
53 Hairatan-Uzbekistan Rail Project, Afghanistan. http://www.railway-technology.com/projects/
hairatanuzbekistanra/
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Late into the execution of the project, AVM, APM and ERW were discovered.
The initial assessment revealed a 3 sq km area of contamination at an estimated
cost of USD 3 million to clear, which came close to matching Afghanistan’s
national contribution to the project.54
This pattern has been repeated in other infrastructure development projects,
particularly with AVMs due their low detectability in Afghanistan. MACCA
contacted development projects throughout the country in 2013 and found that
a number were in hazardous areas. Out of 430 registered development projects
in Afghanistan (roads, bridges, dams, rail, agriculture, electricity expansion), 71 of
these projects are affected by mines and ERW, and at least 21 are heavily affected
by AT mines, consisting of roughly 225 square kilometres of land.55
As a result, MACCA actively encourages a sustainable and continuous process
in communication with the development sector; otherwise, as in the case of the
railway project, the country suffers huge financial losses that it cannot afford.56
While Afghans hope that the new MEIFCS survey process will help mitigate the
number of collisions between development efforts and landmines, due to the
nature of AVMs, their widespread use in the country and the low-metal content
of the types used in Afghanistan, uncertainty over the possible presence of AVM
will remain.
Impact Example 3: Copper mine near Anyak
AVMs are also inhibiting Afghanistan’s efforts to tap into its own natural resources.
In particular, mining for minerals is considered the future of Afghanistan, with hope
that projects will lead to many jobs, electricity and new infrastructure.
The Aynak copper deposit in Loghar Province was discovered in 1974 and is
estimated to contain 11.3 million tonnes of copper. The project is expected to
provide a significant boost to the Afghan economy. The Ministry of Mines of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan contracted a Chinese company (MCC) to develop
and extract copper from the mine.57 In addition to operating the copper mine and

54
55
56
57
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Interview with Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan Director, April 2013
Interview with MACCA, March 2014
Interview with Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan Director, April 2013
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Request for an extension of the deadline
for completing the destruction of APMs in mined areas in accordance with Article 5 under the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of APMs and
on Their Destruction, 31 August 2012, http://www.macca.org.af/macca/?page_id=171, p. 4
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paying large taxes to the Afghan government (USD 350–450 million per year),
the Chinese company also planned to build homes benefiting approximately 400
villagers in the area. The project itself will indirectly benefit 30,000 people through
jobs and infrastructure.58
At the outset of the project, the ministries involved did not adequately consult
with MACCA, as previous national surveys (LIS and Polygon Survey) had not
captured contamination information in that area. Six months into the work, the
Chinese company contacted MACCA to report mine contamination. Surveys later
revealed large areas affected by both APMs and AVMs, including MK7 and TC6.
Work had to be delayed and extra costs were incurred. While the mining project
itself will continue, because of the extent of landmine contamination – including
AVMs – that needed to be cleared, the planned homes were not built, due to
insufficient funds.59

Conclusion
As Afghanistan works to stabilise its society and strengthen its economy
through important new infrastructure projects such as rail networks and mineral
resource development, AVMs have had a demonstrated impact on these projects
at many levels. AVMs also continue to deny access to valuable land for the
country’s agriculture-dependent population. On top of this, civilian casualties
from AVMs continue to occur in the context of housing development, use of
vehicles or construction machinery, and within Afghanistan’s migrating nomadic
communities.
Minimum metal AVM weapons have particularly contributed to prolonging the
negative impacts of past conflicts on today’s humanitarian and developmental
efforts. Mines which have evaded surveys, and even clearance operations, have
forced Afghanistan and donors to spend extra time and resources developing
more effective clearance methods to tackle this challenge in the country’s
unique environmental conditions. These factors all contribute to the severe and
multifaceted impact of AVMs in Afghanistan.

58 Interview with Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan, 9 March 2014
59 Ibidem

Case studies

|

65

CAMBODIA
While still bearing a heavy burden of contamination by landmines and ERW from
its past, Cambodia is in the midst of an important phase of infrastructure and
economic development as it seeks to become a fully integrated member of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the international community.
Beyond increasing agricultural production in many different areas, Cambodia
is seeking to rehabilitate land formerly mined or covered with ERW in order to
carry out large infrastructure projects and attract foreign direct investment. Mine
clearance is thus seen as essential for the economic development of sectors
including tourism, irrigation and energy production.60
As Cambodia pursues these development goals, the threat of AVMs has grown.
The increase in the number of farmers using mechanical tractors, civilians using
vehicles and workers using heavy construction equipment has led to a stark
increase in the number of AVM-related civilian casualties in recent years, so much
so that this total now surpasses the number of APM casualties.
Cambodia has banned mines other than anti-personnel mines in national law
by choosing not to disaggregate APM and AVM types in its national legislation
implementing the AP Mine Ban Treaty.61 Cambodia is party to both the AP Mine
Ban Treaty and the CCW APII prohibiting mines, booby-traps and other devices.
The Cambodia Mine Action Authority (CMAA) and the Cambodia Mine Action
Centre (CMAC), as well as other international organisations working to address
the country’s demining challenge, including HALO Trust and the Mines Advisory
Group (MAG), provided instrumental support in assembling this case study.

A 45 year-old male, his son aged 13 and daughter aged 12 were killed when
their buffalo-cart loaded with wood ran over an old AVM in northwestern
Cambodia’s Oddor Meanchey province in July 2013. The family had been
returning from the forest where they had been collecting wood to build a
house. The two buffalo were also killed.62

60 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Authority, 8 July 2013
61 Ibidem
62 Source: http://english.cntv.cn/20130731/104241.shtml
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Overview of anti-vehicle mine presence
Cambodia’s heavy contamination by landmines and ERW is the result of the
protracted regional and internal conflicts that engulfed it for over 30 years. Even
after 20 years of demining, contamination still poses a heavy humanitarian and
economic burden on the country.
AVM contamination is concentrated in, but not limited to, the northwestern region of
the country, with the most affected province being Battambang.63 Other provinces
severely affected by AVMs include Banteay Meanchey and Pailin. The extensive
contamination in the rice and cassava producing regions along the CambodiaThailand border has served as a great impediment to agricultural expansion there.64
It is reported that 21,582 AVMs, 930,826 APMs, and 2,184,797 ERW have been
recovered and destroyed since mine action started in Cambodia in 1992. In the last
five years, there have been 324 casualties resulting from APMs, 750 from ERW
(including cluster munitions) and 283 from AVMs.65 Although the number of AVMs
is significantly lower than the number of APMs in Cambodia, in recent years there
have been more casualties per annum resulting from AVMs than from APMs.
FIGURE 14

MAP OF THE NORTHWESTERN REGION OF CAMBODIA WHERE AVM
CONTAMINATION IS MOST SEVERE, 2008–2012

Source: Cambodia Mine Action Authority

63 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Centre, 8 July 2013
64 Ibidem
65 Statement by Cambodia on MOTAPM at Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,
Meeting of States Parties, November 2012
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National data collection system and AVM data handling
Cambodia is in the process of finalising a new national baseline survey (BLS)
aggregated from local knowledge and incident data. Figures 14 and 15 illustrate
its findings as of mid-2013. The survey found that over 68 square kilometres of
land is suspected to contain AVMs alone and over 300 square kilometres of land
is contaminated by mixed AVM and APM minefields.
Local knowledge and reported incidents form the basis for the national BLS.
Because this method relies on knowledge of contamination through sightings
or past incidents, the BLS process is particularly prone to missing AVMs.
Communities can be unaware of AVMs if vehicles never cross their land, and
for this reason there are still frequent incidents in areas outside those marked in
the BLS.66

66 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Centre, 8 July 2013
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BASELINE SURVEY RESULTS SHOWING AVM CONTAMINATION (A3)
AND MIXED ANTI-VEHICLE AND ANTI-PERSONNEL CONTAMINATION (A2)

FIGURE 15

AS OF MID-2013

127,978,274

Total A2+A3 Area (sqm)

2,189

127,618,566

Total A2+A3 polygons

10,711,640

1,644

13,398,811

A3 Area (sqm)

225

13,588,010

256

A3 polygons

117,266,635
374

12,789,719

A2 Area (sqm)

1,964
114,030,557
246

A2 polygons

Banteay Meanchey
1,270
609,092

Province

Battambang
10

Kampong Cham

203,031

105,409

5

2

8,357

1,459

105,409

2

20,858,894

2

2

1,340

216

3,936,003

201,573

1

16,145,818

30

27,729,434

3

7,017

179

722,724

468

10,098,037

Kampong Speu

1
4,713,076

6

8,706,347

152

683,929

5,228,754

Kandal
37

3,213,279

190

2,127,178

8

5,578,447

59

Kratie
24

19,023,088

47

190,335

74

6,314,394

179,660

Mondul Kiri
278

7,970,859

4

573,189

63

6

Oddar Meanchey
105

493,594

12

30,330

5,049,094

Pailin
4

5,005,258

4

53

Phnom Penh

62

6,284,064

Kampong Thom

Preah Vihear

59

Kampot

Pursat

12,277,106

55,585

149

1

215,252
55,585

100,092

1

2

372,784,469

10,611,348

5,438

118

4

8,568,009

68,187,332

2,043,340

12,061,854

83

100,092
1,338

35

145

Siemreap

2

304,597,137

Sihanoukville

Takeo

4,100

Svay Rieng

Total

Source: Cambodia Mine Action Authority

69

|

Case studies

History of anti-vehicle mine use
Under the leadership of Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge (KR) ruled Cambodia from 1975
to 1979. Its policies lead to mass famine and genocide of the Cambodian people.
Even whilst in power, the KR deployed a limited number of AVMs around the areas
of Phnom Penh, Battambang and Banteay Meanchey as a defence against possible
anti-regime revolts and to protect itself from brewing tensions with Vietnam.
The true proliferation of landmines in Cambodia did not begin until 1979 when
Vietnam eventually invaded Cambodia, overthrew the KR and occupied the
country for the next decade. As Vietnam intervened, the KR retreated to, and
fought to defend, base camps along the northwestern border near Thailand. During
this time, the KR began using AVMs to surround their strongholds for defensive
purposes. The KR also mined tracks and roads used by the new Cambodian
government and Vietnamese troops, typically to cut off access to ammunition
and to disrupt the transportation of other supplies between Vietnamese military
bases. With the gradual success of these tactics, the KR moved to the offensive

|
|
70
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Yellow posts marking recently cleared AVMs (TM-46) and
APMs at a HALO Trust demining site in Battambang province.

use of AVMs, such as laying them in relatively open spaces in dense forest (where
vehicles had to pass) and in proximity to water sources.67
Vietnam also used AVMs as defensive weapons against the KR, keeping some
(but not complete) records of their use, and even marking some minefields
before later withdrawing from Cambodia. After the Vietnamese military had
pushed the KR out of Cambodia and across the border to Thailand, in 1984–85,
it used AVMs as defensive weapons in attempts to prevent the KR from returning
to the country. The Vietnamese used forced labour of up to 100,000 people to
lay a barrier minefield along the 750 km-long Cambodia-Thailand border. This
infamous mine belt became known as the K5. Most of the mines in the belt are
APMs, with a smaller number of AVMs spread throughout. The KR ultimately
stole many of the K5 mines and then used them against the Vietnamese forces
that laid them.68
Even after the Vietnamese withdrawal, internal fighting between factions within
Cambodia continued, as did the laying of AVMs. The Cambodian national army
distributed AVMs to regional commanders to use freely in their respective
regions. There were no reports, records or verification back to the capital
concerning use.69
The types of AVMs most commonly used in Cambodia were the TM 46 (both
Chinese and Russian versions), TM 57 and TM 62. The KR mainly acquired its
AVMs from China; the Cambodian government from the Soviet Union and East
Germany; and Vietnam from Czechoslovakia. Russian-made TM 46 AVMs are
found throughout northern regions of Cambodia, and the Chinese TM 46 is the
most commonly found AVM type in the country as a whole.70
There are very few records of the deployment of AVMs during Cambodia’s
decades of conflict. The old indications recorded for localisation, such as
‘along the road’ or ‘near the big tree’ largely disappeared due to changes in the
landscape from deforestation and the disappearance of old roads. By the time
the refugees returned to their land after the end of the conflict, old roads were
often hidden by thick vegetation, leaving people with no sense of where to
expect contamination. Furthermore, there are few maps or records documenting
the locations of old roads.71

67
68
69
70
71

Interview with HALO Trust Cambodia, 11 July 2013
Ibidem
Ibidem
Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Centre, 8 July 2013
Interview with HALO Trust Cambodia, 11 July 2013
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An AVM at a HALO Trust demining site found with several
APMs positioned directly on top of it.

Common tactics and configurations of AVMs in Cambodia included: (i) several
AVMs stacked on top of each other in order to destroy tanks rather than temporarily
immobilise them; (ii) a single AVM augmented by APMs around or directly on top of
it in order to increase sensitivity and to protect it; (iii) AVMs laid in close proximity in
the shape of a triangle to increase the chance of capturing a vehicle manoeuvering
around a single mine; and (iv) an AVM buried deep in the ground with an upright
stick between the mine and the ground, sensitising the mine while avoiding
detection. This was a reactive KR tactic when they discovered that Vietnamese
deminers detected and removed AVMs deployed at a shallower depth. Deminers
have also found improvised AVMs made using other types of explosives.72

Casualties from anti-vehicle mines
AVM casualties are on the rise and have outnumbered casualties from APMs in
recent years. There were 908 recorded AVM-related civilian casualties between
2000 and mid-2013, compared to only 242 during the twenty years between
1979 and 1999.73 While this stark rise and contrast can be partially attributed
72 Interview with MAG, 8 July 2013; Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Centre, 8 July 2013
73 AVM Basic Impact Survey Conducted by GICHD and SIPRI, 2013 and Cambodia Mine Victim
Information System Olap Cube
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to poor data collection in early years, there is a chance that it reflects reality
to a certain extent: most civilians in northwestern Cambodia were forced out
of their villages when the KR occupied and mined the area during the 1980s,
and civilians have only returned to these areas in large numbers in more recent
years. Even more recently, farmers have begun to employ mechanized farming
equipment at greater levels, thereby disturbing AVMs that have previously gone
unnoticed.
In Cambodia, the most common civilian activities at the time of AVM incidents
have been travelling and farming, with travellers far outnumbering all other
categories (Figure 16). Drilling into the occupational categories of these travellers
(Figure 17), the large majority of travellers are farmers, drivers and children.
Many AVM casualty incidents in Cambodia occur due to the increased use of small
tractors known as rotavators. These vehicles are used in farming by attaching a
plough, and as a means of local transport by exchanging the plough with a trailer
bed. In this configuration, this off-road-capable vehicle is used for transporting
workers out to the fields, family transportation, or transporting goods from farms
to markets or to export centres.

|

A rotavator in Battambang district of Cambodia.
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An example of this type of accident occurred in September 2012, when seven
people riding in the trailer bed of the rotavator were killed by the blast of a
TM 46 AVM. The driver was severely injured but survived, which is a common
pattern because the rotavator driver’s seat sticks out in front of the trailer and
back wheels, which normally trigger the mine due to the heavy load of people or
goods carried in the trailer.
In this case, the driver was transporting seven of his relatives back from a market
near another village, and the group included three of his children. The incident
occurred in the middle of a road that had been used by these communities for
many years. Villagers are still not sure why the incident occurred, but speculated
that the mine may have shifted during the rainy season. The BLS had identified
the road and the surrounding area as safe given that the area had previously been
cleared in 1993–95. The BLS result had been shared with the affected village in
2012. The incident highlighted a gap in the existing methodology in identifying
AVM contaminated land, as well as in mine risk-awareness communication to
local populations.74 Following the incident, CMAC cleared 2,000m of the road.
Authorities in Cambodia attest that the country requires mine risk-awareness
education specifically for AVMs, but it is currently not conducted.
A similar accident occurred in November 2010, again with a TM 46, when
13 people riding on a rotavator trailer, along with a load of chillies, were killed as
the driver steered slightly off the road to avoid a pothole. Only the driver survived
the incident.75
Accidents such as these have resulted in a very specific fear of AVMs in the region.
Communities are more confident that APMs have been cleared, but suspect that
there may be unknown AVMs in the area and are afraid to expand agricultural
production. Families in the Battambang village grow rice and vegetables (cassava,
corn and sesame), and they affirm that once land surrounding the village is cleared
of mines, they intend to use it to expand their production of crops.76
Casualty data collection and AVM data handling in Cambodia
Cambodia has a very robust data collection system to gather, analyse and learn
from casualty data. The system could provide a good example to other states
and enabled this study’s research team to better understand the specific impact
of AVMs in the region given the level of detail in reporting. The Cambodia Mine
74 Interview with AVM survivor, 10 July 2013
75 Ibidem
76 Ibidem
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Victim Information System (CMVIS) was established in 1995 by the Cambodian
Red Cross, with funding from UNICEF and Handicap International. The system
was later handed over to Cambodian authorities in 2008, which transferred it to
the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) in 2011.77
The official process for reacting to an accident begins with a Red Cross volunteer
reporting to the area to collect basic information on the event and victims. A CMAA
field officer then conducts follow-up interviews with survivors and witnesses, fills
in the standard forms for the CMVIS database and informs demining operators
of the accident. The CMVIS team then reviews the data and may ask the field
officer questions for clarification or verification.78 The goal is always to flesh out
all details of the accident, including what the victim was doing at the time, his
or her occupation and other personal details. These details are loaded into the
CMVIS database and publically distributed in the form of monthly reports and
OLAP Cubes on the CMVIS website.
Importantly, Cambodia’s casualty data reporting system calls upon operators to
specify whether the type of mine was an AVM or APM by checking the appropriate
box in the victim report form, allowing the CMAA to better understand the
increasing number of casualties that AVMs are causing. However, the procedure
does not require identification of the type of AVM which caused the incident,
leaving some ambiguity on which models and which features of the mines may
be to blame in different areas.
CMVIS costs approximately USD 100,000 per year to operate. The CMAA reports
that this is the minimum level of resources needed to run a network that allows
the CMVIS to capture relevant casualty data throughout the country and better
target clearance efforts.79

77 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Authority, 9 July 2013
78 Ibidem
79 Ibidem
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Cambodia’s Mine and ERW Incident Report that allows for
easy distinction of AVM incident from APM incidents.

AVM VICTIMS BY ACTIVITY AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT,
2005 –2013 (assembled with CMVIS data)
FIGURE 16
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OCCUPATIONS OF VICTIMS CATEGORISED AS TRAVELLING AT

THE TIME OF AVM ACCIDENTS, 2005–2013 (assembled with CMVIS data)

FIGURE 17

Despite the CMVIS system’s extensive coverage, there is still a perception that not
all incidents get recorded, especially because injuries and deaths can be reported
much later when clearance teams come to an area marked in the BLS. Cambodia’s
ambition is to have national coverage of mine victim reporting, and the Cambodian
mine action authorities believe that a common terminology between internal
ministries will be necessary to achieve nationwide mine data coverage.80

Developmental impact of anti-vehicle mines
The robust and detailed casualty data collection system in Cambodia has allowed
authorities to observe a distinct increase in AVM-related incidents in recent years.
The details associated with the data show that the increase is largely due to
increased development throughout the country, primarily in the agricultural sector.
Beyond the casualties themselves, the mere observation of the increase in AVM
incidents by local communities is inhibiting development progress in several ways.
In the northwest, observing the rise in incidents involving tractor users has increased
the perceived threat of AVM contamination. Some local communities choose to stick
to using the less effective tools of cows and manual labour to farm their land even if
this means smaller yields. Another example is that many farming operations in the
region rely on villagers renting tractors to conduct farm work, and some suppliers
are not willing to rent equipment to farmers in AVM contaminated areas.81
The Mine Action Planning Unit (MAPU) is responsible for post-clearance monitoring
(PCM). The CMAA trains all PCM staff and has designed a standard questionnaire.
MAPU has three staff dedicated to PCM in northwestern Battambang, a province
heavily contaminated by AVMs. PCM of 725 plots of land cleared in 2011 took place
between October 2012 and February 2013, and results showed that by far the most
common use of new land is for agriculture. Ten years ago, PCM staff reported the
most common use of cleared land was for resettlement of refugees and IDPs.82
Throughout the Cambodian government, AVM clearance is beginning to be seen
as an increasingly important development requirement. While APMs remain a
clearance priority due to international treaty obligations, as Cambodia’s national
strategy is to expand exports (particularly rice) to new overseas markets (such as
Europe’s), AVM clearance is seen as an obstacle that must be surmounted in order
to reach the country’s production targets.83
80
81
82
83

Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Authority, 9 July 2013
Interview with UNDP, 8 July 2013
Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Authority, National Project Officer, 10 July 2013
Interview with MAG, 8 July 2013

Case studies

|

79

Beyond agriculture, AVM contamination has also presented obstacles to
large-scale projects such as the expansion of irrigation and power schemes.
The Government of Cambodia requires all prospective large-scale construction
projects to first survey the land for contamination. The company involved must pay
for the survey, and this factor has occasionally deterred potential foreign investors.84
AVMs also have an influence on Cambodia’s tourism sector, which has begun to
grow thanks to recent years of stability in the country. Authorities say they take
pains to inform those of the estimated three to four million visitors per year who
rent cars or drivers about the risks of AVMs and other types of ERW. There is a
pervasive fear that any tourist involvement in an incident in Cambodia might have
a lasting and severe impact on the sector.85
In terms of clearance, demining operators are beginning to see a marked increase
in requests to clear AVM threats. MAG, an international NGO focused mainly
on APM clearance in Cambodia, reports an increase in requests from local
communities to clear AVMs as reactions to increased AVM incidents in their
areas. MAG reports that accidents involving AVMs primarily occur in areas without
APMs, as people are unaware of mine contamination.
MAG runs clearance operations incorporating manual, mechanical and Mine
Detection Dog (MDD) techniques. The large vehicles that MAG uses to clear dense
vegetation cannot be used in areas with AVMs given that an AVM would damage
the machine, and donors therefore will not allow the risk. Beyond this challenge,
MAG states that AVMs deployed together with APMs are the most expensive to
clear as it requires clearance in stages, using multiple methods and techniques.86

Conclusion
Overall, as Cambodia works to recover from its past and toward greater integration
with the regional and international community, the presence of AVMs has been
shown to be a factor significantly slowing processes of recovery and growth.
AVMs continue to elude Cambodia’s comprehensive survey efforts given that
some communities do not become aware of their presence until it is too late.
Despite the fact that the number of AVMs in Cambodia is significantly lower
than the number of APMs, in the past few years, AVMs have killed more civilians
than APMs.

84 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Authority, National Project Officer, 10 July 2013
85 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Centre, 8 July 2013
86 Interview with Mines Advisory Group, 8 July 2013
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Beyond this threat, with villages choosing to avoid mechanised farming out of fear
of hitting an AVM, and cases of foreign investment in the country’s infrastructure
projects being deterred, Cambodians can point to a variety of reasons – other
than casualty counts – for their decision to make AVMs illegal in their country and
prevent these weapons from affecting future generations.87

SOUTH SUDAN
South Sudan gained its independence from Sudan on 9 July 2011, but only after
a decades-long civil war which took the lives of two million people. The Compre
hensive Peace Agreement signed between the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan, in January 2005, included the
right of Southern Sudan to conduct a referendum on its independence.
Peace has nonetheless been fragile in South Sudan, partly caused by tensions
with the north, and partly by internal fragmentation. On 15 December 2013,
South Sudan relapsed into conflict. Fighting between the government forces
and opposition groups caused over 1,000 deaths and displaced some 738,000
people internally in addition to 130,400 people who fled to neighbouring states.
The situation in the country remains volatile despite the signing of a cessation of
hostilities agreement on 23 January 2014.88

87 Interview with Cambodia Mine Action Authority, 12 July 2013
88 UNHCR spokesperson Melissa Fleming, press briefing, 14 Feb. 2014, Palais des Nations in Geneva,
http://www.unhcr.org/52fdfcad9.html
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As the world’s newest sovereign state, South Sudan faces tremendous political
and economic challenges. The economy, which is extremely dependent on oil
revenues, has been vulnerable to conflicts over the use of Sudan’s pipelines and
oil export facilities.89 In parts of South Sudan, up to 90 per cent of the households
depend primarily on agriculture and livestock for their subsistence.90
Although by no means the only cause of instability and underdevelopment in
South Sudan, landmine contamination further challenges state-building and
development efforts. Both APMs and AVMs have been used extensively in South
Sudan, and over 30 different models of AVMs have been found in the country
to date. This variation and unpredictability in the contamination deepens the
challenge of clearance and recovery. This chapter focuses specifically on the AVM
presence in the country and analyses the impact of contamination on civilian life,
development efforts and clearance operations. As a newly sovereign state, South
Sudan has acceded to the AP Mine Ban Treaty, but has not yet joined the CCW or
the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).
The South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, United Nations Mine Action
Centre and a number of mine action operators including the Norwegian People’s
Aid (NPA), Mine Tech International (MTI), G4S and Mechem provided instrumental
support in assembling this case study.

A bus carrying civilians exploded after it drove over an AVM in Juba,
South Sudan,in October 2011. The accident resulted in 20 fatalities, including
four children. 91

Overview of anti-vehicle mine presence
South Sudan is heavily contaminated by landmines and ERW, with widespread
presence of both APMs and AVMs. All ten states in South Sudan are contaminated
by AVMs to various degrees, though Eastern Equatoria, Central Equatoria and

89 The Guardian, ‘South Sudan: in numbers’, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/
datablog/2012/jul/09/south-sudan-in-numbers-key-statistics
90 African Development Bank, South Sudan: An Infrastructure Action Plan. A Program for Sustained
Strong Economic Growth, 2013, p. 132
91 Source: http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan-republic/un-says-bus-mine-blast-southsudan-killed-20
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Jonglei are especially affected. Some northern regions of South Sudan are
also heavily contaminated by AVMs, given that many were laid as Sudanese
government forces retreated from Southern Sudan.92

FIGURE 18

IDENTIFIED AVM HAZARDS IN SOUTH SUDAN, AS OF SEPTEMBER 2013

Source: South Sudan NMAA

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is currently responsible for coordinating
demining in South Sudan, together with the developing South Sudan National
Mine Action Authority (NMAA), and constantly finds new areas to clear. In 2012,
the majority of the new tasks involved AVMs. Due to the expansion in the number
of hazardous zones, and new information coming in from clearance operations,
UNMAS does not know the full extent of South Sudan’s contamination.93

92 Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
93 Ibidem
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No maps or records of landmine contamination were kept during the Sudanese
civil war.91 Mine clearance therefore depends on local knowledge and mine
encounters, including incidents. IDPs and refugees returning to South Sudan
often find mines upon their resettlement, and mine incidents and casualties are
still frequent.95
UNMAS and the Government of Sudan commissioned a landmine impact survey in
South Sudan in 2003 (then still a part of Sudan) in order to assist in setting priorities
for mine clearance for the newly established national mine action programme.
The survey, carried out between 2005 and 2009, showed that states in the
future South Sudan consisted of a range of low to medium and highly affected
communities. The impact survey was not fully comprehensive in its coverage, due
to difficulties in accessing certain areas, partly because of insecurity. Importantly
for this study, the survey did not make a distinction between AVMs and other
types of landmines.96
When the 2005 Peace Agreement was signed, many roads in South Sudan were
impassable due to landmines, especially AVMs. Roads leading to Uganda, Kenya,
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia were all mined, causing major
obstacles for returning refugees and IDPs, as well as for delivery of emergency aid
and other resources. So far, 22,000 km of roads have been cleared of landmines,
including most of the country’s major roads. However, smaller roads are still
contaminated and, as a result, many rural communities remain isolated. As an
example, three roads in Eastern Equatoria state are still not in use due to AVMs.
Even some roads in Central Equatoria state (where the capital Juba is located) are
contaminated with AVMs.97
Reports of the continued use of mines (both APM and AVM) in South Sudan
continue to surface, though the exact users remain unclear. Recent reports have
pointed to use of AVMs by rebel forces in Unity state and Jonglei state in the
areas of Khorflus and Khorwai. One particular report pointed to use by the South
Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA) – a rebel faction – that reportedly laid mines in
Unity state.98

94 Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
95 Interview with South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
96 Survey Action Center, Landmine Impact Survey: Republic of Sudan, 2010,
http://www.sac-na.org/pdf_text/sudan/SDN_FinalReport.pdf
97 Interview with South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
98 Landmine Monitor, South Sudan Country Profile, Mine Ban Policy (updated 25 November 2013)
http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3190
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CONTINUED USE OF AVMs IN SOUTH SUDAN
AS REPORTED IN LANDMINE MONITOR
99

A number of reports have surfaced in recent years regarding the possible
continued laying of landmines, including AVMs.
• In Unity state, there were several reports of AVM use in 2011, claiming

multiple casualties including in May, August, September, and October.
[Landmine Monitor, South Sudan Country Profile, Mine Ban Policy,
Updated 25 November 2013.]
• In June 2011 the Southern Sudan Mine Action Authority expressed

concern at new civilian deaths from what seemed to be newly-laid AP
and AVMs. [Statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Standing
Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 23 June 2011.]
• A representative of the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) Southern Sudan

told media that evidence indicates rebel militia groups were laying mines
and said, ‘We’ve seen an increase in mine incidents and mine accidents
over the past six months or so and in many areas we think there are a lot
of alleged cases of re-mining. We can’t prove it because we haven’t seen
it but anecdotal evidence indicates that these are newly laid, not old mines.’
[Maggie Flick, ‘Landmines in Southern Sudan,’ Huffington Post, 4 June
2011, citing an interview with Tim Horner, Deputy Director of the UNMAO
in Southern Sudan.]
• In August 2011, five people were killed and 21 seriously injured in two

separate AVM incidents. The governor of Unity state condemned the
mine use, which it said was carried out by rebels led by James Gai Yoach,
who have broken away from SSLA following the acceptance of a ceasefire agreement with the government of South Sudan. [Bonifacio Taban
Kuich, ‘Landmines kill 5 and injure 21 in South Sudan’s Unity state,’
Sudan Tribune (Bentiu), 23 August 2011.]
• In November 2011, a UN Mine Action and Coordination Centre (UNMACC)

representative told media that routes leading into and out of the state
capital Bentiu were suspected to be mined. [‘Relentless Use of Landmines
in South Sudan Sparks Fear,’ Voice of America, 21 November 2011.]
• In December 2011, a UNMACC representative said that it was increasing

efforts to unblock aid and trade routes in Unity state because ‘the re-mining
has shut down most of the state.’ [‘Amputees reap bitter fruits of separation
in Sudan state,’ mysinchew.com, 17 December 2011.]
99 Condensed from Landmine Monitor (updated 25 November 2013)
http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3190
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• In 2011 and 2012, the ICBL expressed concern at ‘alarming reports’

of new landmine use by NSAGs in South Sudan, but noted it was not
possible to determine who was responsible or whether AP mines
in addition to AVMs had been laid. [Statement of ICBL, Mine Ban
Treaty Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the
Convention, Geneva, 20 June 2011. Ibid., 25 May 2012.]
• In January 2012, a former senior SSLA member interviewed by Amnesty

International admitted that their forces had laid AVMs on Unity state roads
expected to be used by SPLA forces, but denied that SSLA forces had
laid AP landmines. According to the former SSLA member, ‘We had some
landmines but we kept many of them back. We sent intelligence guys to
lay down anti-tank mines, and then attract SPLA forces to them.’ [Amnesty
International, ‘South Sudan: Overshadowed Conflict,’ 28 June 2012, p. 23.]
• The Small Arms Survey documented newly-laid Chinese manufactured

T-72 AVMs, reportedly laid by the South Sudan Liberation Army (SSLA)
around Mayom in Unity state. [Small Arms Survey, Sudan Human Security
Baseline Assessment, ‘Anti-tank and anti-personnel mines in Unity and
Jonglei states,’ 5 March 2012.]
• In June 2013, a resident in Sudan’s White Nile state told a South Sudan

media outlet that ‘armed rebels’ planted landmines in an area from Wadakona,
a village in South Sudan’s Upper Nile state to the border with Sudan’s White
Nile state. After a farmer died when his tractor hit a mine, the listener said,
‘People are now avoiding using vehicles for fear of landmines.’ [‘Landmines
kill and maim civilians on Sudan – South Sudan border’: source,’
Radio Tamazuj, 19 June 2013.]
• The NMAA conducted a fact-finding mission in June–July 2013 to

engage with civil authorities in the states of Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity,
and Western Bahr El Ghazal. The NMAA engaged in discussions with the
Governor and the Deputy Governor as well as the Sector and Division
Commanders from the SPLA. Both the civil authorities as well as the
SPLA denied allegations of being involved in new mine laying activities.
However, the SPLA confirmed that new mines had indeed been laid by
rebel forces in Unity state and also in Jonglei state in the areas of Khorflus
and Khorwai. [UNMAS has been unable to independently verify the
allegations due to access restrictions to the alleged sites. Email from Lance
Malin MBE, UNMAS, 14 October 2013.]
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National data collection system and AVM data handling
The national data collection system is a collaborative effort by several international
demining operators reporting to UNMAS, which manages the Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). Regional survey teams collect
data on mines and UXO that they then send to the national authority. Community
liaison teams also report to UNMAS based on the results from MRE programmes.
UNMAS feeds the data into IMSMA. To facilitate local ownership of the database,
UNMAS is currently training South Sudan National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)
staff on how to use the software and reporting mechanisms.

The most accurate information on contamination comes from completion reports.
Demining operators write a completion report on each task, which they then
submit to IMSMA. Reports specify the type of mine and the location, either
identifying the location of a single mine (in case of a spot task) or a mine field (in
case of a polygon task), and list the number of AVMs, APMs and UXO destroyed.100
Mine action operators in South Sudan aim to distinguish AVMs from APMs in
their survey, clearance and incident reporting. However, the reports submitted
by demining organisations vary in their level of detail. Some only report clearance
at the polygon level, without providing the coordinates of the individual mines
cleared. While some organisations do provide this information, because of this
variation it is not possible to provide a map of all AVMs cleared in the country.
In addition, some of the reporting forms in use allow for free text entry in areas of
the form identifying the type of hazard – this variation can make it more difficult to
later sift out information regarding the specific types (APM versus AVM) or models
of landmines encountered from the larger database.
100 Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
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The information submitted in incident reports also varies depending on what
information is available to the investigator. UNMAS reports that it is standard
practice to try to identify the type of device and determine if there are more
hazards around the site of the incident. However, the device type may not always
be identifiable, e.g. if there is nothing left of the device or if an investigation was
not possible due to inaccessibility.
According to one operator, unless one sees a mine or an incident, it is difficult to
differentiate between different kinds of contamination, and basic training may be
required to identify the correct type of munition, e.g. distinguishing an AVM from
a RPG.101 However, in the case of a detonation, deminers may be able to tell that
an AVM caused an incident based on signature characteristics, such as the crater
size and the presence of mine remnants.
The survey and hazard form, which is completed before a clearance task, is often
based on local reports and knowledge, and untrained interviewees may not
be able to distinguish different devices from one another. Therefore, the most
accurate reports identifying devices are those completed post-clearance by
demining operators.102
For these reasons and uncertainties, national AVM data in South Sudan remains
incomplete, and data that is available on both contamination and incidents
provides low estimates.

History of anti-vehicle mine use
AVMs were used by both sides during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–
2005), which was fought by Sudanese government forces and the south’s
opposition army, the SPLA, whose political wing is now in government in
South Sudan.
AVMs were mainly used in South Sudan as part of guerrilla warfare. The SPLA
used AVMs as a defensive weapon, in particular to impede road access to
Sudanese government forces. The SPLA would place AVMs along transport
routes, around their bases and in other strategic locations. Both belligerents
would typically lay AVMs along the contested ‘buffer zone’ running between
their opposing military bases. Very few tanks were used in Sudan during the war

101 Interview with Mechem, Juba, 5 Nov. 2013.
102 Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service (IMSMA section), Juba, 5 Nov. 2013;
Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013.
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(around 20 in total) and the SPLA had none. AVMs were instead aimed at
destroying the support vehicles carrying supplies and other logistics during the
conflict. AVMs were considered an important weapon in this asymmetric conflict,
especially for the militarily weaker SPLA.

FIGURE 19

TYPES OF ANTI-VEHICLE MINES FOUND IN SOUTH SUDAN
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Demining operators have commonly reported that mines were seemingly
laid arbitrarily, with little patterns and very few records. This matches with
reports that during the conflict, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)
had weak logistical support, and soldiers travelling on foot would often carry
mines on their heads in stacks and distribute them irregularly.103 In some
cases, different types of mines were often directly connected to one another
on the ground (e.g. using a tripwire) so detonating one mine would set off
the other.104
G4S operators in South Sudan have reported often finding AVMs located
around bridges, as well as in typical ambush locations afforded by geographic
features, where they were placed to strike a convoy. Operators also report
that some mines were left in forests and elsewhere when foot soldiers found
carrying them became too difficult.105
MTI also reports finding AVMs on roads or close to roads, close to bridges
and in landscapes suitable for defensive positions.106 They have also
commonly found AVMs beyond roads. Mines laid at checkpoints, for example,
were left behind when the checkpoints moved. Other cases include finding
AVMs surrounding bases of the belligerent groups, which could migrate and
leave the mines behind. Even on the outskirts of Juba, close to the airport,
farmers found AVMs when they started to cultivate the land. Mines are also
found on old, overgrown roads, and although this AVM contamination has a
more limited impact at the moment, it could cause problems in the future if
such land is later developed.107
A unique feature of the mine contamination in South Sudan is the wide
variety of AVMs present, with over 30 different types found to date. The most
commonly found AVMs in South Sudan include types from China, Russia,
Italy, Belgium and the UK. The acquisition routes of these weapons, for both
the SPLA and the Sudanese government are unclear. The SPLA’s supply
included, but may not have been limited to, weapons captured from the
Sudanese government. The Sudanese government might have had a more
stable source of supply, possibly from China.

103
104
105
106
107

Interview with Mining Technologies International, Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
Interview with South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
Interview with Mining Technologies International, Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
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Casualties from anti-vehicle mines and casualty data
Prior to the 2011 independence referendum, the number of AVM casualties
reported was relatively low in South Sudan when compared to other states with
similar levels of contamination. UNMAS and the Sudanese authorities’ national
strategy was to primarily target road clearance. This benefitted the clearance
of AVMs and is likely to have had an impact on lowering the number of AVM
incidents. Although this demining strategy has undoubtedly shown results in the
past decade, the financial costs of these operations have also been significant.
FIGURE 20

AVM CASUALTIES IN SOUTH SUDAN, AS OF SEPTEMBER 2013

|
|
|

This map shows recorded civilian casualties in South Sudan from 2004 to 2013.
Authorities have emphasised that this data set is incomplete, especially in the northern
states, due to ongoing conflict and the inaccessibility of certain areas. Source: NMAA

Since the beginning of mine action activities in South Sudan in 2004, national
authorities have recorded 482 civilian casualties due to AVMs. They emphasise,
however, that reported numbers of casualties are likely to be significantly less
than the actual number, given that much of the country remains inaccessible to
reporting efforts due to security concerns.
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During 2007–10, the NMAA reported only a handful of casualties per year, but in
2011 this increased to 112 reported AVM victims. That year, following increased
tensions after the referendum, some 400,000–500,000 people moved into and
across South Sudan.108 This great increase in casualties was most likely simply due to
these large population movements as people fled conflict zones, with many refugees
from the South Kordofan and Blue Nile states in Sudan fleeing into South Sudan.
AVM incidents continue to take lives and injure civilians in South Sudan. Towards
the end of 2013, there was, for example, an AVM incident in the area of Bentiu
town in the north, close to the border with Sudan.109
South Sudan employs a cooperative process for reporting on landmine incidents
and collecting information. Following every landmine incident, the mine action
operator closest to the location is sent to the site. The operator fills in an incident
form and UNMAS staff follow-up on the incident with an investigation, including
a visit to the site and interviews with survivors and witnesses.110 Non-fatal victim
reports from AVM incidents are rare, since there are normally few survivors.111
Although all UNMAS teams are capable of conducting investigations concerning
landmines incidents, UNMAS sometimes cannot visit certain sites due to security
concerns and inaccessibility due to heavy rains or remoteness. Furthermore,
UNMAS does not have effective access to certain border areas. Parts of Jonglei
state, for example, cannot be investigated, and incident report forms are only useful
when trained personnel have access to the site.112 For these reasons, UNMAS
suspects that a number of AVM or APM related casualties go unreported each year.

Developmental impact of anti-vehicle mines
AVM presence in South Sudan poses challenges to development in a number of
areas. Up to this point, the country’s low population density and lower levels of
mechanized agriculture partially explain South Sudan’s low casualty figures relative
to the extent of mine contamination. The AVM threat may become even greater as
the country’s population grows, the movement of people increases, the number of
vehicles grows and as roads are used more frequently. As such, it is possible that
the number of AVM incidents will rise as development progresses in South Sudan.113
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Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
Interview with South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
Ibidem
Interview with Mining Technologies International, Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
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FIGURE 21

NMAA RATED THE FOLLOWING AREAS AS SUFFERING ‘VERY SEVERE’

	 EFFECTS DUE TO AVMs IN THE BIS

Road access for humanitarian aid
Road access for refugee return
Restoration of land for grazing livestock
Development of new areas for energy resource exploration

Key areas suffering from the impact of anti-vehicle mines
Resettlement and movement of people
Landmine contamination has affected the movement and resettlement of IDPs
and refugees in South Sudan. In the 2008 landmine impact survey, 247,562
IDPs and refugees were expected to resettle in Central Equatoria state alone.114
After South Sudan gained independence in 2011, there was a sudden influx of
Sudanese refugees from Sudan’s South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Large
movements of returnees continued in 2013.115 Since mid-December 2013,
renewed conflict in South Sudan has internally displaced 738,000 people, and a
further 130,400 have fled to neighbouring countries, primarily Ethiopia, Kenya,
Sudan and Uganda.116
Although data is incomplete, AVM incidents in South Sudan do at least partly
correlate to an increase in the movement of large groups of people. The stark
increase from five AVM casualties in 2010 to 112 AVM casualties in 2011 can be
partially attributed to the swell in population movements that year as a result of
the referendum. Looking toward the future, as IDPs from the most recent eruption
of conflict in the country look to resettle, they may, for example, start to use old
or smaller roads, and will be at risk of triggering AVMs that have not yet been
documented due to inaccessibility or renewed mine laying.

114 Landmine Impact Survey – Sudan: Central and Western Equatoria States,
July 2008, p. 14, http://www.sac-na.org/pdf_text/sudan/GE_Report_Jul08.pdf
115 UNHRC, South Sudan, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4e43cb466.html (accessed: 25 Feb. 2014)
116 UNHCR spokesperson Melissa Fleming, press briefing, 14 Feb. 2014,
Palais des Nations in Geneva, http://www.unhcr.org/52fdfcad9.html
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Agriculture and food production
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) states that South Sudan is
enormously rich in natural resources, and with 95 percent of the population
dependent on them for survival, it has significant potential for sustainable growth
through agriculture. However, FAO’s satellite land cover survey showed that just
4.5 percent of the available land was currently under cultivation.117
Currently, much rural sector activity in South Sudan is focused on low-input,
low-output subsistence agriculture instead of production for markets.118 Mine
clearance priorities are access to water and firewood collection, land for cultivation
and transport to remote villages. In the short term, most of the cleared land will be
used for subsistence farming of crops such as cassava, maize, peanuts and other
vegetables119 As this farming is most commonly done by hand in South Sudan,
there are many cases where villagers have lived in AVM-contaminated land without
detonating an AVM. However, in the longer term, when farming shifts from manual
to mechanical tools and vehicles, this co-existence will no longer be possible.
AVMs also affect other areas of development and livelihood in the country.
In Eastern Equatoria state (along the Torit road to Katri), minefields containing
AVMs have hampered the development of tea plantations, timber production and
sugarcane plantations. The limited timber sector in South Sudan could expand,
and possibly make a more significant contribution to the economy, were it not for
AVM contamination in these off-road areas that are more difficult to survey and
clear.120 Dinka communities in northern areas including Jonglei and the Upper Nile
are cattle herders and live off their livestock – they have repeatedly stated that they
worry about mines as cattle have been known to activate AVMs.121
Foreign Direct Investment
The presence of AVMs in South Sudan has been a deterrent to Foreign Direct
Investment in various sectors. Before even starting to plan a project, investors
must get verification and a certificate from the NMAA that the area of interest has

117 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ‘South Sudan naturally
endowed for sustainable growth through agriculture,’
http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/81693/icode/
118 African Development Bank, South Sudan: An Infrastructure Action Plan.
A Program for Sustained Strong Economic Growth, 2013, p. 131
119 Interview with Mining Technologies International, Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
120 Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
121 Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
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been cleared of landmines. Known contamination has affected road development,
building of power lines and the extractive industries.
Smaller foreign investment projects are particularly prone to being put off by
AVMs, given the smaller budgets typically involved. For example, an Indian
company expressed an interest in developing a sugar field, together with a refinery,
in the border area between Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei states, but the investors
pulled out due to landmine contamination that included AVMs.122
In terms of major resource extraction projects, gold exploration in Eastern
Equatoria is one area that has been affected by mine contamination.123 This state
has therefore been listed as one of the priority areas in the national clearance
strategy, as fear of mines remains a deterrent against new investments in gold
prospecting.124 Oil and gas companies, on the other hand, are better prepared for
potential contamination and have their own deminers.
In general, as South Sudan moves to develop its economy, AVM contamination
exists as yet another risk with the potential to deter private sector investment
across these various industries.125
Infrastructure
Road clearance has been a top priority for UNMAS in South Sudan, with
approximately 22,000 km of roads cleared over years of collaborative efforts.
The landmine threat on roads in South Sudan is primarily caused by AVMs rather
than APMs. The Juba-Bentiu road was previously closed due to AVMs, but has
now been cleared, as is the case with many major roads in South Sudan.126 Before
the outbreak of renewed conflict, clearance of all major roads in Eastern Equatoria
was due to be completed in 2014, with the next priority being to clear side roads.127
Road clearance has had a positive impact on many levels, facilitating access to
more demining and aid, opening up trade and travel opportunities, and bringing
access to education and healthcare to rural communities. In addition, the national
railway line, connecting Babonosa in Sudan with Wau in South Sudan, was cleared
of landmines in 2007 and is now open again for traffic.128
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Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
Interview with South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
Interview with G4S Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
Interview with United Nations Mine Action Service, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
Ibidem
Interview with South Sudan National Mine Action Authority, Juba, 4 Nov. 2013
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Despite progress made along main roads, South Sudan is still faced by AVM
threats both alongside some major roads, as well as throughout smaller peripheral
road networks. In the early years of clearance, emergency humanitarian demining
clearance standards called for the clearing all major roads connecting key towns
to a width of 8 m. In 2004–05, clearance standards issued by UNMAS changed
to a width of 20–25 m in order to capture more of the contamination and allow
for possible development alongside roads.129
There have been a number of incidents alongside roads that were only cleared to a
width of 8 m, and demining operators frequently find more AVMs next to cleared
roads. NPA responded to a clearance request when a road construction company’s
bulldozer detonated an AVM whilst laying a new road surface.130 Mechem staff
reported on an AVM incident in which a bus detonated the mine on a road from
Bentiu to Nhialdiu in Unity state in August 2011. The victims were aware of the
contamination, but had no choice but to use the road as there was no alternative
route.131
New use of AVMs also presents a continued threat as reports of new mine laying
occasionally surface. In June 2013, a resident in Sudan’s White Nile state told a
South Sudan media outlet that ‘armed rebels’ planted landmines in an area from
Wadakona, a village in South Sudan’s Upper Nile state to the border with Sudan’s
White Nile state. After a farmer died when his tractor hit a mine, the listener said,
‘People are now avoiding using vehicles for fear of landmines.’ 132
A closer look at the impact of anti-vehicle mines on communities
in South Sudan
The following examples are of sites visited by this study’s research team, which
illustrate both the use and impact of AVMs.
Site visit 1: Lobonok
The research team visited a clearance site operated by NPA outside the town
of Lobonok, in an area home to approximately 600 people. The area was
contaminated with North Korean ATM 72 mines, and the site had been identified
because of an AVM accident involving a bulldozer that had been widening the road

129
130
131
132

Interview with Mechem, Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
Interview with NPA, 4 November 2013
Interview with Mechem, Juba, 5 Nov. 2013
‘Landmines kill and maim civilians on Sudan – South Sudan border,’ Radio Tamazuj,
19 June 2013 via Landmine Monitor South Sudan Country Profile
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to Lobonok. The area had previously been part of one of the SPLA’s last major
strongholds, and the road leading through a valley landscape was a good tactical
setting for AVMs. AVMs were laid along the road, as well as in areas that would
have allowed the enemy convoy to pass around an ambush point.
The mine action operators reported that members of the community had been
very eager to use the land. Farmers had even risked their lives by planting crops
in areas still under clearance to take advantage of the fact that the land had been
cleared of vegetation and tilled during demining.133

|
|

An NPA landmine clearance site near Lobonok
containing North Korean ATM 72 mines.

Site visit 2: Ayii
A second site visited during the investigation was near the Juba-Nimule highway,
a major road between the capital and Uganda. AVMs were found near a former
Sudanese Armed Forces base. Eight of the mines were found by a family in their
cassava plantation just a few meters from the highway. It was reportedly a fairly
common occurrence for villagers to find AVMs after having used the land for

133 Interview with NPA, 4 November 2014

Case studies

|

97

quite some time without incident. So far, there has been little reported impact
when the AVMs are found off the road like this given that heavy machinery is not
commonly used. However, as communities develop and start to use vehicles and
mechanised farming equipment, the presence of AVMs could have more serious
consequences.

|
|

The estimated boundaries of a suspected AVM field off
of a major road leading from Juba into Uganda.

Site visit 3: Kuda
A third site visited during the study was the larger village area of Kuda, with
a population of approximately 7,000 people. YM III AVMs were found in a
defensive formation around a former SPLA base. The low metal content of
these mines had clearly been problematic because the mines had been missed
by a previous clearance operation in this area in 2008. UNMAS and NMAA
are currently investigating this particular incident. In Kuda, as in many areas
throughout South Sudan, the mines were laid in very close proximity to the
villagers, with one actually having been found just outside the front door
of a home. Villagers reported that a major reason why so few people had
returned to resettle this area after the conflict ceased was due to the extensive
contamination.
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A MineTech International demining site in Kuda with suspected AVM presence.
The red posts indicate boundaries marking mine presence.

|
|

A MineTech International demining site in Kuda with suspected AVM presence.
Demining personnel use the red posts to indicate the boundaries of mine presence.
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Conclusion
South Sudan re-entered a period of civil conflict in early 2014, and it is not yet clear
how long the instability may last, nor how much of the progress the country has
made in terms of rebuilding, mine clearance and development might be undone.
Up until now, the greatest impact of AVMs on South Sudan has been its burden
on key road networks. The country therefore heavily prioritised major routes for
clearance, and achieved great progress through the collective efforts of mine
action personnel in the country. In spite of this progress, South Sudan continues
to suffer from AVM incidents, with civilian casualties occurring on rural roads and
alongside both major and periphery routes. In 2014, as communities displaced by
the recent violence are forced to move along possibly unfamiliar paths, they will
likely be at an increased risk to becoming victims of the still pervasive threat of
AVMs in the country.
South Sudan continues to experience the negative impacts of AVMs in areas
ranging from distributing humanitarian aid to resettlement and to agriculture and
animal husbandry. The country has little public infrastructure and a great deal
of subsistence farming is currently conducted by hand. The possibility exists,
therefore, that South Sudan has yet to experience the full impact of its AVM
contamination, as some rural communities still manage to coexist with mines.
Future infrastructure development projects or the increased use of mechanised
farming practices may yet reveal remaining AVM contamination and this could
slow South Sudan’s efforts to stabilise, progress in its development and eventually
prosper.
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CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings from this study show that the humanitarian and developmental impact
of AVMs can increase in the aftermath of a conflict as a state progresses towards
recovery. Factors in post-conflict development, such as the return and resettlement
of populations, the gradual increase in the number of civilian vehicles for transport
and farming, and new state infrastructure projects using heavy equipment, have
all been hampered or inhibited by the presence of AVMs.
The significance of the negative impact of AVMs on stability and development
should not be understated. In Cambodia, successful development is needed to
sustain the country’s recovery from previous decades of conflict. In Afghanistan,
poverty continues to fuel insurgent uprisings that threaten stability both
domestically and regionally. In South Sudan, civil unrest has caused the country
to slide back into conflict. While AVMs are certainly not the only challenge faced
by these states, the data and examples collected in the context of this study
demonstrate that residual AVM contamination is a significant factor inhibiting a
more accelerated recovery and development process.
There is already a great deal of evidence available to demonstrate the negative
humanitarian and developmental impact of AVMs on civilians, and this study
has found that even this data remains significantly incomplete. Both the global
overview and country case study investigations brought forth the fact that
data gaps exist for a variety of reasons. In over half of the states surveyed in
the context of this study, many states could not provide certain estimates of
AVM contamination and casualty data simply because it was not effectively
differentiated from APM data. There have also been historic lapses in
contamination and casualty data collection due to conflict. To this day, sometimes
surveyors are not able to gather data because they either cannot access insecure
areas or because the AVM contamination goes unnoticed by communities without
vehicles living in their midst.
Despite these difficulties, even more can be done to mitigate the impact of these
weapons on civilians, as well as improve AVM data collection practices as detailed
in the observations and recommendations below. This information stream will
continue to inform and build the international community’s understanding of the
significant negative impact of AVMs on civilians and states and how to effectively
act in addressing this unequivocal challenge.
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GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Observation 1

Recommendation 1

AVMs are in many ways similar
in design, function and impact
to APMs, yet they are subject
to different obligations under
international law. Furthermore, their
usage could contradict a number
of humanitarian principles,
including those of distinction and
proportionality.

Discussions should continue
on further regulating the use of
AVMs to comply with existing IHL
principles.

Observation 2

Recommendation 2

The case studies described in
this report concurred that AVM
contamination is much more likely
to be missed by survey efforts than
APM contamination. This is mainly
due to the fact that rural populations
in developing countries are less likely
to trigger AVMs, as they are less
likely to be using vehicles or heavy
equipment. This AVM hazard thus
becomes more of a risk for these
countries in the long-term, with
AVM contamination surfacing later
to impede development and poverty
reduction efforts.

States Parties to the CCW should
abide by the requirement to record
the geographic coordinates of
mines and minefields, i.e. in APII
of the CCW. In addition, further
restrictions, including a prohibition,
on the laying of AVMs outside
perimeter marked areas would
provide a clear cut and effective
means to reduce the impact of
AVMs on civilians.
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Observation 3

Recommendation 3

Low metal AVMs are often missed
by standard surveys, especially
when planted alone. Despite
deminers’ best efforts in a number
of countries, many of these mines
are still missed by modern clearance
methods and continue to pose a
great hazard to civilians attempting
to develop their land.

If AVM production cannot be
deterred or prevented, states should
explore ways of ensuring that AVMs
produced in the future include
measures to enable detectability
by humanitarian demining teams,
including a minimum metal content
specification.

Observation 4

Recommendation 4

Mine risk education specific to
AVMs is not conducted in certain
countries.

Civilian populations should be
educated on the specific hazards
posed by the types of AVMs found
in their countries, including factors
such as usage strategies and
characteristics that might caution
civilians developing new areas of
land and enable their identification.
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OBSERVATIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING
TO DATA COLLECTION
Observation 5

Recommendation 5

There is a limited amount of
information specific to AVMs in the
public domain. States tend to report
on and discuss landmine issues
collectively, rather than differentiating
between AVMs and APMs.

Greater emphasis should be placed
on the distinction between APMs
and AVMs, especially considering
the existing differences in legal
provisions concerning them and
the different technical hazards they
pose. States should be encouraged
to disaggregate their landmine data
according to type of contamination,
as recommended in the International
Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
In addition, states should also make
these figures available to the public
in order to inform open and public
debate on the impact of this type
of weapon.

Observation 6

Recommendation 6

As found in the case studies of this
research, AVM data sometimes
cannot be aggregated, not because
it is not being collected, but rather
because the information cannot be
easily extracted from the database
of collection forms. The reasons for
this seem to be due to the fact that
personnel are free to use their own
words: ‘anti-vehicle mine,’ ‘anti-tank
mine,’ ‘AT,’ ‘ATM,’ etc. Therefore,
when a staff member attempts to
aggregate data by searching the
database, not all of the reports on
hazards or victims emerge.

Both Hazard Reporting Forms and
Victim Reporting Forms should be
further standardised. There should
be a decrease in the reliance on
‘free-text entry’ for identifying
weapon types. A better practice
might be to include boxes to check
(as Cambodia’s forms demonstrate),
so that AVM data can be easily
aggregated, tracked and reported
to the public and the international
community.

106

|

Conclusions and recommendations

Observation 7

Recommendation 7

The case studies revealed that it is
not easy to determine which AVM
features may be causing the greatest
negative impact (e.g. size, metal
content, fusing structures, etc.).
This is because it is not a common
practice for states to include the
model of the mines in their national
reporting systems. While Hazard
Report Forms and Victim Report
Forms allow personnel to enter
whether the mine is an AVM or an
APM, some country forms do not
include a field for identifying the
model of the mine involved in an
incident. In countries such as South
Sudan, where a wide variety of
foreign landmines have been used,
it becomes difficult to understand
the detailed impact of specific AVM
types or characteristics.

It should become standard practice
for government and mine action
personnel to enter the mine model
(if known) in Hazard Reports,
Completion Reports and Victim
Reports, using a standardised
notation format so that the information
can be sifted from the database.
As this dataset grows, it will allow
the international community to gain
a better understanding of the details
or characteristics of the effects of
specific AVM types in order to help
mitigate their effects on civilians.
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APPENDIX
ANTI-VEHICLE/TANK MINE TYPES AND MANUFACTURING
COUNTRIES AS OF 2011134
Important note: This list is historic and should not be deemed absolute or complete.
The majority of the mines are now no longer in production and several of the
countries listed have banned the production of mines altogether.

Mine

Type

Albania

MKTBT

Anti-Tank Blast

MKT Mod 72

Anti-Tank Blast

Austria

ATM 6

Anti-Tank Off route

ATM-7

Anti-Tank Off route

ATM-75, Model 67

Anti-Tank Blast

ATM 96

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

ATM 2000E (Pz Mi 88) and ATM 2000

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

AVC 100

Anti-Vehicle Directional Fragmentation

AVC 195

Anti-Vehicle Directional Fragmentation

Argentina

FMK-3

Anti-Tank Blast

FMK-5

Anti-Tank Blast

Belgium

PRB M3/A1

Anti-Tank Blast

PRB-111

Anti-Tank Blast

Brazil

AC NM AET1

Anti-Tank Blast

T-AB-1 (AT)

Anti-Tank Blast

Bulgaria

PTM-80P

Anti-Tank Blast

TM-62M PZ (TM-62P3)

Anti-Tank Blast

TMD-1

Anti-Tank

134 Source: IHS Jane’s Mines and Explosive Ordnance Disposal © 2011 IHS
www.ihs.com/products/janes
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Chile

Cardoen Anti-Tank

Anti-Tank Blast

MAT 84-F5

Anti-Tank Blast

MP-APVL 83-F4

Anti-Tank Fragmentation

China
SATM

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

Type 72 ‘Non metallic’

Anti-Tank Blast

Type 72 ‘Metallic’

Anti-tank Blast

Type 84

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

Cuba

AT Mine

Anti-Tank Blast

Former Czechoslovakia
Na-Mi-Ba
PT Mi-Ba
PT Mi-Ba-II
PT Mi-Ba-III
PT Mi-D
PT Mi-K
PT Mi-P
TQ-Mi

Anti-Tank Blast
Anti-Tank Blast
Anti-Tank Blast
Anti-Tank Blast
Anti-Tank Blast
Anti-Tank Blast
Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
Anti-Tank Blast

Czech Republic

PD Mi-PK

Anti-Tank Off Route

PT Mi-D1 & PT Mi-D1M

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

PT Mi-U

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

Egypt

FBM

Anti-Tank Blast

M/71

Anti-Tank Blast

M/80

Anti-Tank Blast

T-93

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

TC/6

Anti-Tank Blast

France

HPD

Anti-Tank

Finland
MSM MK2 (PM-87)

Anti-Tank Blast

TM-65 & TM-65/77

Anti-Tank Blast

Germany

AT2

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

DM 11 (AT)

Anti-Tank Blast

DM 21

Anti-Tank Blast

MIFF

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

PARM 1

Anti-Tank Off Route Shaped Charge

PARM 2

Anti-Tank Off Route Shaped Charge
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Germany (cont.)

PM-60

Anti-Tank Blast

Riegel Mine 43

Anti-Tank Blast

Tellermine 35

Anti-Tank Blast

Tellermine 42

Anti-Tank Blast

Tellermine 43

Anti-Tank Blast

Hungary
HAK-1

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

UKA-63

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

India
Adrushy

Anti-Tank Blast

Mine Anti-tank ‘Non-Detectable’ 1A

Anti-Tank Blast

Mine Anti-tank ‘Non-Detectable’ 3A

Anti-Tank Blast

International
ARGES (MACPED)

Anti-Tank Off Route

ATIS

Anti-Tank Blast

Iran
M19

Anti-Tank Blast

YM-II

Anti-Tank Blast

YM-III

Anti-Tank Blast

Israel
No 6

Anti-Tank Blast

Italy
BAT/7

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

MAT/5

Anti-Tank Blast

MAT/6

Anti-Tank blast

MATS/1.4

Anti-Tank Blast

MATS/2

Anti-Tank Blast

MATS/2.6

anti-Tank Blast

SB-MV/1

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

SBP-04

Anti-Tank Blast

SBP-07

Anti-Tank Blast

TC/2.4

Anti-Tank Blast

TCE/6

Anti-Tank Blast

VS-3.6

Anti-Tank Blast

VS-AT4 and VS-AT4-EL

Anti-Tank Blast

VS-HCT

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

VS-HCT2

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

VS-HCT4

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

VS-SATM1

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
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Japan
Type 63 (AT)

Anti-Tank Blast

Type 93

Anti-Tank Blast

Korea, North
ATM-44

Anti-Tank Blast

ATM-46N

Anti-Tank Blast

ATM-72

Anti-Tank Blast

ATM-74

Anti-Tank Blast

Korea, South
K441 and K442

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

M19

Anti-Tank Blast

Montenegro
TMM-1

Anti-Tank

Netherlands
NR 25

Anti-Tank Blast

NR 26 and NR 26C1

Anti-Tank Blast

Type 2, T40

Anti-Tank Blast

Pakistan
P2 Mk 2 (AT)

Anti-Tank Blast

Peru
MGP-30

Anti-Tank Blast

MGP-31

Anti-Tank Blast

Poland
Kasia 100

Anti-Tank Off Route

Kasia 170

Anti-Tank Off Route

Kasia 2 x 100

Anti-Tank Off Route

MN-111

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

MN-121

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

MN-123

Anti-Tank Blast

MPB

Anti-Tank Off Route

MPP-B ‘Wierzba’

Anti-Tank Blast

Portugal
M453

Anti-Tank Blast

Romania
MAT-62B

Anti-tank blast

MC-71

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

MAT-76

Anti-Tank Blast

Russian Federation
PGMDM/PTM-1S/PTM-1G

Anti-Tank Blast

PMK-1

Railway Mine

PTM-3

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

TM-46/TMN-46

Anti-Tank Blast
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Russian Federation (cont.)
TM-57

Anti-Tank Blast

TM-62B

Anti-Tank Blast

TM-62M

Anti-Tank Blast

TM-72

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

TM-83

Anti-Tank Off Route

TM-89

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

TMD-44

Anti-Tank Blast

TMD-B

Anti-Tank Blast

TMK-2

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

Serbia
TMM-1

Anti-Tank

Singapore
STM-1

Anti-Tank Blast

Slovakia
PT Mi-Ba

Anti-Tank Blast

South Africa
Intelligent Horizontal Mine

Anti-Tank Off Route

No 8

Anti-Tank Blast

‘Non-metallic’ anti-tank mine ‘Malapa’

Anti-Tank Blast

Spain
C-3-A/B

Anti-Tank Blast

Sweden
FFV -16 (Fordonsmina 14)

Anti-Tank Off Route

FFV -028 (Stridsvagnsmina 6)

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

Model 41-47

Anti-Tank Blast

Model 47

Anti-Tank Blast

Model 52

Anti-Tank Blast

Turkey
M19

Anti-Tank Blast

United Kingdom
Adder, Addermine

Anti-Tank Off Route

Barmine

Anti-Tank Blast

Mk 5

Anti-Tank Blast

Mk 7

Anti-Tank Blast

United States
BLU-91/B ‘Gator’

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

M1A1

Anti-Tank Blast

M6A2

Anti-Tank Blast

M7A2

Anti-Tank Blast

M15

Anti-Tank Blast
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United States (cont.)
M19

Anti-Tank Blast

M21 ‘heavy anti-tank mine’

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

M24

Anti-Tank (HEAT warhead)

M75

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

RAAM (M70)

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

SLAM

Anti-Tank Off Route

Former Yugoslavia
KB-PTM (Ababeel)

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

TMA-1A

Anti-Tank Blast

TMA-2

Anti-Tank Blast

TMA-3

Anti-Tank Blast

TMA-4

Anti-Tank Blast

TMA-5

Anti-Tank Blast

TMD-1/2

Anti-Tank Blast

TMM-1

Anti-Tank Blast

TMRP-6

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge

TMRP-7

Anti-Tank Shaped Charge
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